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"WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GRANT": CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
THE PATENT POWER
EdwardC Walterscheid*
I. INTRODUCTION

Congressional authority to legislate concerning patents is derived from
the constitutional grant of power set forth in the following language:
"Congress shall have Power * * * To promote the Progress of... useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to
their... Discoveries."' For convenience sake, I will refer to this language as
the Patent Clause or simply the Clause. In 1966, in Graham v. John Deere
Co. the Supreme Court declared that the Patent Clause "is both a grant of
power and a limitation."2 The Court was speaking in the context of its view

that the Clause contains an inherent constitutional standard of invention'
that must be met in order for an invention to be patentable, but at the same

time it indicated that the Clause precludes Congress from authorizing "the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the

public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already [publicly]
available." 4 In 1989, the Court reiterated these points, and noted a further

* Mr. Walterscheid is a legal historian specializing in the history of intellectual property law in the
United States. He has published two books and numerous articles detailing various aspects of this history.
I U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8,cl. 8. See alho Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 US. 1,6 n.1, 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 459, 462 n.1 (1966).
2 383 U.S. at 5.
That standard is addressed in the text accompanying infra notes 120-66.
383 U.S. at 6. This view that the Patent Clause absolutely precludes Congress from issuing patents
that 'remove existent knowledge from the public domain" is more restrictive than that held by the Court
in the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1815, the Court upheld the validity of an act of Congress
authorizing the reissue to Oliver Evans for an additional term of 14 years a patent that had expired three
years earlier. See Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9Cranch) 199 (1815). Based on such authority, through much
of the nineteenth century term renewals and extensions authorized after the original patent had expired
and the subject matter was in the public domain were judicially upheld. See, eg., Agawam Woolen Co.
v. Jordan, 74 U.S. (7Wall.) 583 (1868); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648,650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No.
1,518).
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limitation, namely, that "Congress may not create patent monopolies of
5
unlimited duration."
The Court has thus made clear that there are constitutional limitations
on the patent power of Congress. In setting standards or conditions for
patentability, Congress may be more restrictive than the limitations set by
the constitutional language,6 but it may not avoid or ignore those limitations. Phrased differently, there are requirements set forth in the Patent
Clause which Congress must conform to in enacting patent legislation. Care
must be taken to distinguish clearly between standards for patentability and
patentable subject matter because they are not the same thing at all. While
there are clearly constitutional requirements that must be met in setting
standards of patentability, the nature of any constitutional restrictions on
patentable subject matter is less clear.
The purpose of this article is to delineate and analyze the limitations
placed on the patent power of Congress by the Patent Clause. It is useful to
begin with the views expressed by Chief Justice Marshall first in Marbury v.
Madison' in 1803 and later in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden.' In Marbury he
noted that "[i]t cannot be presumed, that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect," 9 and then declared:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and
that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the
constitution is written. To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction between a

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,146,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1850
(1989).
' The reason is that nothing in the Constitution requires Congress to issue patents, so it can be as
highly restrictive as it chooses in setting the conditions for patentability. See Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover
Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 494 (1900) (stating that Congress, having created the monopoly, may put such
limitations upon it as it pleases).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
5 U.S. at 174. In 1822, President Monroe would make the same point, saying: "no part of the
Constitution can be considered useless; no sentence or clause in it without a meaning." James Monroe,
Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822) in 2
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1908 144, 163 Games D. Richardson, ed., 1909). I am
indebted to Daniel Preston for bringing this paper by President Monroe to my attention.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished,
if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are
imposed, anf if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal
obligation. l

The import of this is that powers are both granted and limited in the
Constitution, and that limitations may not be ignored.
In Gibbons he emphasized his opposition to any narrow construction of
the enumerated powers but went on to state:
[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and
the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended
what they said. If from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent
of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects
for which it was given, especially when those objects are
expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. * * * We know of no rule for
construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by
the language of the instrument which confers them, taken
in connexion with the purposes for which they were
conferred."
In the context of the Patent Clause, these views have added significance, for
they clearly indicate that in 1824 the Court was of the view that a statement
of purpose or objects "should have great influence" on its interpretation.
Phrased somewhat differently, the statement of purpose, i.e., "to promote
the progress of . . . useful arts," constitutes a limitation on the extent or
scope of the patent power which must be taken into account when
interpreting it. I shall have cause to return to this important point.

10 5 U.S. at 176.
" 22 U.S. at 188-89.
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1". CONGRESSIONAL DISCRETION

In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court on a number of occasions
set forth inconsistent views on the scope of congressional authority to set
the terms and conditions of patents. In this regard, several opinions
suggested that congressional power under the Patent Clause was plenary, i.e.,
without qualification. 2 Thus, for example, in 1843 in McClurgv. Kingsland
the Court stated "the powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of
patents is plenary by the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no
restraints on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to modify
[the patent laws] at their pleasure, so [long as] they do not take away the
rights of property in existing patents." 3 In 1899, it declared:
Since, under the Constitution, Congress has power 'to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries,' and to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying that expressed power into execution, it follows that
Congress may provide such instrumentalities in respect of
securing to inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries
as in its judgment will be best calculated to effect the
object. '
Unfortunately, in making these pronouncements, the Court let itself be
carried away by its rhetoric, for the power of Congress respecting patents
is not plenary, but rather is qualified and restricted by certain express
language of the Patent Clause as well as such other constitutional limitations
as may exist." Thus, on several other occasions in the nineteenth century,
12 Black's Law Dictionary defines "plenary" as "full, entire, complete, absolute, perfect, unqualified."
1154 (6th ed. 1990).
" 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
14 United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 583 (1899).
1s Nonetheless, the idea that the patent power, if not plenary, was the next thing to it was
commonplace in the nineteenth century. Thus, for example, in his magisterial patent treatise published
in 1890, Robinson states:
The authority thus conferred on Congress [by the Patent Clause] is unrestricted as
to the method of its exercise. The subject of the exclusive right must be a writing or
discovery of the person to whom the right is granted, and the period during which
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it had expressly recognized this to be the case. For example, in 1829 in
Pennock v. Dialogue it declared that the constitutional language "contemplates... that [the] exclusive right shall exist but for a limited period."16 In
1856 it held that the power granted to Congress by the Clause "is domestic
inits character, and necessarily confined within the limits of the United
States.""7 In 1878 it held that the exclusive property right authorized by the
Clause and encompassed within the patent grant does not preempt the
authority of a state to regulate the sale of patented material under the
reasonable exercise of its police power."8 Despite these cases, one modern
commentator still argues that there was an "early judicial conviction that the
intellectual property clause grants plenary power to Congress in patent
matters, rather than sets limits to the exercise of that power."' 9 What there
was early on was a less than critical analysis of the qualified nature of the
power actually granted to Congress.
The Graham Court sought to avoid any such impression by citing to
Gibbons in stating that "[w]itbin the limits of the constitutionalgrant, the
Congress may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by
selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional
aim."2" In addition, it cited to McClurg in support of its view that "[w]itbin
the scope establisbedby the Constitution,Congress may set out conditions and
tests for patentability."2 While this latter statement is clearly correct, it is
not supported by McClurg where the Court stated that the congressional
patent power was plenary, i.e., unqualified or unlimited.

the right may be enjoyed must be determined by the letter of the grant. As to all
other matters Congress is supreme. It may refuse all privileges whatsoever. It may
bestow them with or without conditions. It may establish such a period for their
duration as it deems expedient. It may exhaust its powers by special grants to
individual authors and inventors, or by a general law award to all a uniform
protection. Its action may be retrospective or prospective, as long as vested rights are
not impaired.
WLLiAM C. RoBINSON,1THE LAw OFPATENTS FOR USEFu INVENTIONS 46(1890). Seealso Graham

v. Johnston, 21 F. 40, 42 (1884) (ITrhe constitutional power of congress for securing to them the
exclusive right to their inventions has only one restriction, viz., that it shall be for limited times.).
" 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 16-17 (1829).
17 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1856).
" Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1878).
'9 Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the "Original' Patent Clause: Pseudobistory in Constittional
Construction, 2 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 155, 175 (1989).
'0 383 U.S. at 6 (emphasis added).
21 Id (emphasis added).
n See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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The emphasized language above clearly indicates that while Congress has
discretion to set the terms and conditions of patentability, that discretion is
not unbounded but rather is constrained by "the limits of the constitutional
grant." 3 Nonetheless, the Graham Court would have better served all
concerned by simply acknowledging that the views expressed in McClurg
were overbroad, and then emphasizing that the congressional patent power
of necessity is qualified by the language of the Patent Clause. Be that as it
may, if the patent power is not plenary, what are the constitutional
limitations on that power?
]lI. LIMITATIONS ON THE PATENT POWER

The Graham Court noted that the qualified authority given to Congress
with regard to the issuance of patents "is limited to the promotion of
advances in the 'useful arts.' " Consequently, "Congress in the exercise of
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated
constitutional purpose."24 It did not, however, provide any clear-cut
explanation of the nature of those restraints or of the nature of any
limitations on the patent power imposed by other language of the Patent
Clause. Here, I consider in some detail what those restraints or limitations
are and the extent to which they serve as a predicate for the statutory
conditions for patentability set by Congress.
For terms that are so fundamentally important to the patent law, it is
remarkable that the Supreme Court has never attempted to define what is
meant by the terms "inventors" and "discoveries" as used in the Clause.2"
Neither, for that matter, has Congress, although in the Patent Act of 1952

2 383 U.S. at 6.
24 383 U.S. at 5 and

6.

25 The Court early on had an opportunity to address the meaning to be given to these terms but

declined to do so. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 513 (1818). Burchfiel suggests that Justice
Black's dissent in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 275
(1942) is predicated "upon an essentially semantic argument that the constitutional terms 'inventors' and
'discoveries' may be redefined according to individual justices' views of the intrinsic worth of the
invention." See Burchfiel, supra note 19, at 170. Justice Black had stated: "The Constitution authorizes
the granting of patent privileges only to inventors who make 'discoveries.' * * * To call the device here
an invention or discovery such as was contemplated by the Constitution.. . is, in my judgment, to
degrade the meaning of those terms." 315 U.S. at 138. However, he did not attempt any definition of the

meaning to be given to "inventors" and "discoveries" as used in the Constitution.
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it did define "invention" to mean "invention or discovery."26 Aside from
being more than a bit circular and vague," the congressional definition of
"invention" ignores the fact that in the early republic there was a considerable dispute as to whether "discovery" and "invention" were to be considered
synonymous. 28 Moreover, the Framers seem not to have contemplated that
the terms "inventors" and "discoveries" could-and would quickly-be
viewed in a restrictive light by Congress and the courts.
A. A CONSTITUTIONAL QUID PRO QUO

The Patent Clause authorizes Congress to create a limited-term exclusive
property right in inventors of patentable subject matter. It does not,
however, provide any express indication of what, if anything, the inventor
is required to do in return for this exclusive right. It is now commonplace
to treat a patent as a contract between the inventor and the public as
represented by the government, but this concept had yet to be developed at
the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787.

Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797; see also 35 U.S.C. S 100(a) (1994).
' It is akin to saying "a rose is a rose is a rose," but without the aesthetic value. According to
Federico (who along with Giles Rich) was largely responsible for drafting the Patent Act of 1952, that Act
was intended to clarify that "invention" is a neutral term that can be applied either to "discoveries" that
meet the statutory requirements of novelty and nonobviousness or to those that do not. P.J. Federico,
Commentary on the New PatentAct, 35 U.S.C.A. S 1, 17 (1954). In this view, the terms 'inventors" and
"discoveries" as they appear in the Patent Clause have little or no relevance in the determination
constitutionally of patentable subject matter.
2' In 1816 Oliver Evans, for example, argued strenuously that "discoveries" had a much broader
meaning than "invention." As he put it:
What ideas then do the terms invention or discovery, inventor or discoverer, as used
in the patent laws, convey? They certainly are not synonymous, for may not a thing
be discovered without invention? Certainly it can; a plant unknown may be
discovered, or a new use of a known plant, by diligence and search, without
invention. A new and useful principle or law in nature may, by expensive and
laborious researches or experiments, be discovered, though the aid of invention may
be necessary to apply them to useful purposes. A man may travel over Europe, Asia
and Africa at great expense, on purpose to discover what improvements are in use
there, "not known or used" in the United States, and in case he introduces them for
the benefit of his country, did neither the framers of the constitution, nor congress,
contemplate areward for such expensive and patriotic labours to promote the welfare
of his fellow citizens? Certainly they did intend to secure to the discoverers of things
new and useful, in the UnitedStates, the exclusive right to their respective discoveries,
for limited times.
26

OuVER EVANS, EXPOSITION OF PART OF THE PATENT LAW BY A NATIVE BORN CITIZEN OF THE
UNITED STATES 60-61 (1816).
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The earliest known published statement that a patent represents a
contract between the inventor and the public in the United States, or for
that matter, Great Britain appears to have been made by Joseph Barnes in
1792 in Philadelphia. 9 As he put it,
a system for securing property in the products of genius, is
a mutual contract between the inventor and the public, in
which the inventor agrees, on proviso that the public will
secure to him his property in, and the exclusive use of his
discovery for a limited time, he will, at the expiration of
such time, cede his right in the same to the public; thenceforth the discovery is common right, being the compensation required by the public, stipulated in the contract, for
having thus secured the same."
Barnes implied that, under this contract thesis, the consideration for the
grant was an enabling disclosure provided by the inventor in the form of a
specification to the patent.3
The views expressed by Barnes were predicated on an at times subtle but
nonetheless clear transition as the eighteenth century progressed in the
British crown's views on the consideration for the patent grant. Early in
that century, it had been assumed that what the inventor gave in return for
the exclusive grant was the working or practicing of the invention within
the country. But the crown came increasingly to recognize that working the
invention was an insufficient consideration for the grant, and that instead
wider dissemination to the public in general should be the desideratum. Just

It was not until the beginning of the nineteenth century that the English courts expressly set forth
this view. Although Inlow contends that by about 1780 "the idea of the contract in the patent grant was
being previewed," he cites no authority for this view and none has been found. He incorrectly states that
"Ithe equitable concept of contract was first actually advanced by Lord Eldon in Cartwrightv. Amatt in
1800." See E.G. INLOW, THE PATENT GRANT 63, 68 (1950). The correct reference should be to
Cartwrightv. Earner. No report of this case has been found, but it is mentioned in Harrnerv.Playne, 11
East, Reports, 1 Abbott's P.C. 171 (K.B. 1809).
O JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE JUSTICE, POLiCY, AND UTILIY OF ESTABLISHING AN
EFFECTUAL SYSTEM OF PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN THE

PRODUCTS OF GENIUS 25 (1792).
" He argued that nothing more should be required of the inventor than an accurate specification and

"[a] patentee's right in his patent shall cease, and be declared void... on proof being given of his not
having specified the true means of producing the proposedeffect." Ui at 32.
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as importantly, the common law courts began to voice the same view. In
1787, it was argued that "[t]he consideration, which the patentee gives for his
monopoly, is the benefit the public are to derive from his invention after his
patent is expired: and that benefit is secured to them by means of a
specification of the invention." 2 By 1795 an English judge stated unequivocally that "[t]he specification is the price the patentee is to pay for the
monopoly."" In essence, there was a change in perception-from viewing
the patent as a contract between the crown and the patentee to viewing it as
a "social contract" between the patentee and society.Clearly, the Patent Clause does not speak in terms of any consideration
for the patent grant. But such is implicit in the introductory language of the
Clause, to wit: "to promote the progress of... useful arts." Unless the
patentee by some mechanism teaches how to make and use the invention to
the public, there is no progress in the useful arts as a result of the grant. The
question then becomes one of whether working or practicing the invention
is constitutionally required or whether providing an enabling disclosure in
the specification of the patent is sufficient to meet the object of promoting
the progress of useful arts.
The issue was first brought before the Supreme Court in 1908 in
ContinentalPaperBag Co. v. EasternPaperBag Co. wherein it was argued that
an injunction against patent infringement could not lay because non-use of
the patent by its owner violated the constitutional purpose of promoting the
progress of useful arts.3" For whatever reason, the Court declined to
specifically address whether the statement of purpose in the Clause obligated
a refusal to enjoin infringement, but instead held only that Congress had
selected another policy and had continued that policy for a number of years.
The Court simply assumed that such a policy had been beneficial and was
appropriate.3 '
Nonetheless, implicit in ContinentalPaperBag was an assumption that
the introductory language did not obligate Congress to assure that the

32

Turner v. Winter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1274, 1276 (K.B. 1787).

"

Boulton v. Bull, 126 Eng. Rep. 651, at 656 (K.B. 1795).
HAROLD I. DuTrON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE

14

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852 75 (Manchester 1984). However, it'would not be until early in

the nineteenth century that the common law courts would begin to expressly speak in terms of a patent
being a contract.
" 210 U.S. 405, 422-23 (1908).
'6 Id at 429-30.
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subject matter of a patent would be put in use or worked during the term of
the grant of the exclusive right. A divided Court thereafter would make the
point clear in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, decided in 1945, by reversing a
lower court opinion invalidating a patent on the ground that non-use was
contrary to the constitutional purpose." The majority noted congressional
awareness of non-use and that Congress could predicate patent validity upon
use of the patented subject matter if it so chose." But, emphasized the
majority, "it by no means follows" that a patent grant not so conditioned "is
an inconsistent or inappropriate exercise of the constitutional authority of
Congress 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts' by securing
to inventors 'the exclusive Right to their . . .Discoveries.' "" Rather,
Congress "could have concluded that the useful arts would be best
promoted" by the statutory requirement of a full disclosure of the invention
and the manner of making and using it.' In other words, it was not use but
full disclosure in a published patent that could be viewed as conforming to
the constitutional purpose.
A dissent by Justice Douglas argued that: "The purpose 'to promote the
progress of science and useful arts'. . . provides the standards for the exercise
of the power and sets the limits beyond which it may not go."41 In his view,
non-use was irreconcilable with this purpose. He seems to have been
influenced in no small measure by his view that "[o]f the various enumerated
powers it [the intellectual property clause] is the only one which states the
purpose of the authority granted to Congress."42 But even a cursory glance
at the enumerated powers shows that each contains a statement of purpose
explicit or implicit in the grant of power.
These so-called patent non-use cases indicate that while there is no
constitutional requirement that makes patent validity contingent on the
working or use of the patented invention during the term of the patent,
there is a requirement that Congress ensure statutorily that the public is
324 U.S. 370, 377,64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525, 529 (1945).
Id at 378. The majority pointed out that Congress had in fact chosen to do so in the Patent Act
of 1832, when it conditioned patents to aliens upon the use of the patented invention. Id
'9 Id
,1Id at 381.
Id He seems to have taken this view on the assumption that the grant of power resides only in
the "by" portion of the Clause. I have elsewhere strongly challenged such an assumption. See EDWARD
42

C. WALTERS-ID,
THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE:
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Ch. 5 (2002).
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given a full, enabling disclosure of the invention so that when the term
expires the public may have full use of the invention.4" It is for this reason
that the United States patent law has always contained a requirement that
a patent have a fully enabling disclosure teaching what the invention is and
how to make and use it." One consequence of this is that Congress may not
constitutionally authorize secret patents.45
B. THE NAME ON THE PATENT

The Patent Clause authorizes Congress to secure to "Inventors the
exclusive Right to their... Discoveries. ."' This language clearly limits
congressional authority to the issuance of patents to inventors for their
discoveries. The term "their" represents one of only two positive or express
limitations on congressional power in the Clause."" It is for this reason that

' The Supreme Court has subsequently declared that "[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from
[the patented] invention. . . ." Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 695
(1966). The quid pro quo can only be achieved if the patent teaches how to make and use the invention.
Thus, as set forth in the Patent Act of 1790, the
Specification shall be so particular... as not only to distinguish the invention or
discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a Workman
or other person skilled in the Art or Manufacture whereof it is a branch or
wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof after the expiration of the
Patent term.
Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 110. The current patent law states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, dear, concise and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994).
"s For several decades early in the nineteenth century, the first Superintendent of Patents, William
Thornton, sought to keep the specifications of issued patent secret from the public, but was ultimately
overruled and the practice ceased. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF
USEFUL ARTS: AMERIcAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINITRATION, 1787-1836 281 (1998). On very rare
occasions, Congress has issued secret patents through private legislation. See, e.g., Act of July 3, 1832, 6
Stat. 502. But early in the nineteenth century no attempt was made to challenge these practices on
constitutional grounds. Today, while classified patent applications may be filed, no classified or secret
patent may issue. Instead issuance is delayed until the classification or secrecy order is removed. 35
U.S.C. S181 (1994).
46 U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
l The other resides in the phrase "for limited Times."
Id

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

11

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

(Vol. 9:291

patents are always applied for and issued in the name of the inventor
regardless of who or what entity may actually own the rights to the patent.4"
But for reasons that it has never satisfactorily explained, Congress has
approached copyrights quite differently. A leading copyright treatise states
that "[t]here would appear to be no constitutional objection to permitting
the assignee of an author to claim copyright in the work assigned."49 The
basis for this statement is declared to be that the "author's property right
derived from the Constitutional authority is unquestionably assignable."-'
While this latter statement is indeed true, it does not follow from the mere
fact of assignability that the Copyright Clause"' contemplates that the
copyright should issue in the name of the assignee.
In the patent statutes, Congress has not only assumed but declared that
a patent must issue to the inventor, even though all rights in the invention
may be assigned to another entity. 2 But in the copyright statutes, Congress
has taken a very different tack. The issue arises in the context of so-called
"works made for hire," but it should be noted that from the middle of the
nineteenth century congressional enactments on copyright made little or no
distinction between the author of a work or the proprietor or assignee of the
work when it came to filing a claim or application for copyright. In

" See 35 U.S.C. SS 111, 116, 117, 118, 151, and 152 (1994). See also Kennedy v. Hazelton, 128 U.S.
667 (1888). Robinson made the point expressly in his magisterial patent treatise published in 1890.
ROBINSON, supra note 15, at S 363 ("Without a change in the language of the Constitution, no patent
could be conferred except upon an inventor, and for his own invention or discovery."). More recently,
the D.C. Circuit has expressly declared that the Patent Clause contemplates the grant of a patent only to
the true inventor "either directly or through his assignee." A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556,
562,195 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1-66.22 (2000).

dl.(citing to American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907)).

This is the analog to the Patent Clause and reads: "Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors... the exclusive Right to their...
si

Writings. ....
." U.S. CONST., art. I,S 8, d. 8.

Thus, 35 U.S.C. S 118 (1994) declares that
a person to whom the inventor has assigned or agreed in writing to assign the
invention or who otherwise shows sufficient proprietary interest in the matter
justifying such action, may make application for patent on behalfofand as agent for
the inventor on proof of the pertinent facts and a showing that such action is
necessary to preserve the rights of the parties or to prevent irreparable damage; and
the Director may grant a patent to such inventor upon such notice to him as the
Commissioner deems sufficient, and on compliance with such regulations as he
prescribes (emphasis added).
Note that even though the invention may be fully owned and prosecuted by the assignee, nonetheless the
patent issues in the name of the inventor and not that of the assignee.
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particular, unlike the patent statutes which required that a patent be
obtained in the name of the inventor, there was no specific requirement that
a copyright be obtained in the name of the author."
In the Copyright Act of 1909 Congress expressly defined the term
"author" to include "an employer in the case of works made for hire."' This
definition was reiterated in the 1976 Act, 5 and was declared to adopt "one
of the basic principles of copyright law."16 Congress has thus made explicit
its view that the "author" of works made for hire includes the entity to
whom the property right in the copyrighted work had been assigned as well
as that person who was the creator or originator of the work. Although this
is a highly expansive interpretation of both "authors" and "their" as found
in the Copyright Clause, Congress has never seen fit to address the
constitutionality of such an expansive definition of these terms."7
The legislative history accompanying the Copyright Act of 1909 contains
an interesting discussion of the constitutional aspects of copyright law,
whereas the constitutional aspect is only minimally treated in the legislative
history of the Copyright Act of 1976." Thus, the legislative history of the
1909 Act expressly states that the constitutional authority of Congress to
create copyrights is limited by several conditions, one of which is "that the
subjects which are to be secured are 'the writings of authors.' "" But after
so stating, Congress did not see fit to give any explanation whatever as to
why the term "author" could constitutionally be interpreted to include an
employer "in the case of a work made for hire."' Instead, it merely stated

" Indeed, the Copyright Act of 1856 specifically referred to copyrights granted to proprietors as well
as authors. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49 at App. 7-57.
'sId at App. 6-29.
s517 U.S.C. S 201(b) (2001) ("In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title.").
56 NIMAER & NIMMER, supra note 49 at App. 4-114.
' In the 1976 Act Congress expressly acknowledged that copyright initially vests in the author or
authors of a work. This certainly is consonant with the constitutional language. But in defining the
owner of a work made for hire as an author (see supra note 55), Congress appears to have gone well
beyond a reasonable interpretation of the constitutional language.
" Compare H.R. REP. No. 2222 (1909) (the Senate adopted the same report; see S. REP. NO. 1108),
reproducedin NIMMER & NIomER,supra note 49 atApp. 13-3 1, with H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976),
reproducedin NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49, at App. 4-2-4-216; and S. REP., reproducedin NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 49, at App. 4A-2-4A-255.
' NIMER & NIMMER, supra note 49 at App. 13-10.
Although Congress was only statutorily defining an "author" to include an employer "in the case
of a work made for hire," of necessity it was assuming that the term "authors" in the Clause also read just
as expansively. See supra note 55. While Congress dearly has authority to restrict the definition of
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that the relevant section of the Act "places an interpretation and construction upon the use of certain words."6 1 In the legislative history of the 1976
Act, Congress gave as its reason for the expanded definition that:
The pesumption [sic] that initial ownership rights vest in the
employer for hire is well established in American copyright
law, and to exchange that for the uncertainties of the shop
right doctrine6 2 would not only be of dubious value to
employers and employees alike, but might also reopen a
number of other [unspecified] issues.63
Patterson & Lindberg point out that these unspecified issues include
arguments that invalidating these so-called "corporate" copyrights would
create confusion in the publishing industry and would leave many works
unprotected. They suggest that such arguments are both venerable and
effective 64 although not necessarily valid, for were such invalidation to occur
it is quite possible that the copyright would revert to and vest "in the
responsible hands of the authors who actually created the works."65
The Register of Copyrights has suggested that Congress expanded the
definition of "author" to include employers in the case of works made for
hire because of the perception "that there are great advantages of convenience and simplicity in assimilating employers to 'authors' for all purposes,"
and that "the advantages of making the employer an 'author' for purposes
of the statute outweigh any conceptual difficulties involved in doing so.""
As Nimmer & Nimmer have succinctly put it, "[t]he fiction of the employer
as author was employed ...not in order to achieve substantive results that

"authors," as encompassed in the Clause, for copyright purposes, it has no constitutional authority to
expand that definition and grant copyright to individuals who are not "authors" within the meaning of
the Clause.
61 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49 at App. 13-31.
2 A doctrine in patent law whereby the employer has certain rights in inventions made by his or
her employees in the course of their employment.
'3 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 49 at App. 4-114.
" They are similar to arguments used by the booksellers in England during the eighteenth century
to protect their interests.
15 See L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT, A LAW OF

USERS' RIGHTs 86 (University of Georgia Press 1991).
1 See Register's Supplemental Report 66 (1965), reproduced in NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 49 at
App. 15-93, App. 15-94.
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could not have been otherwise achieved, but rather because of the
'convenience and simplicity' of this manner of achieving [the desired]
results."67 That this legal fiction might run afoul of the constitutional
language seems not to have been contemplated.
"The troubling problem," as Patterson & Lindberg stress, "is that the
reasons that make the work-for-hire doctrine unconstitutional are the very
reasons that make it a convenient and powerful instrument of monopoly.""
Note that the Copyright Clause makes no reference to publishers and does
not purport to authorize Congress to give a limited copyright monopoly to
them. Given the history of copyright in England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, it is very likely that this was deliberate. Indeed, the
House report on the 1909 Act at least implicitly recognized "that to grant
the publisher a copyright would be to grant a corporate entity the rights
intended to protect only the author, and that those rights could be used to
form oppressive monopolies-but then overlooked [or deliberately ignored]
69
its relevance to the work-for-hire doctrine."
It is reasonable therefore to ask on what basis ownership of a work can
be said to define authorship in the constitutional sense. The short answer
is that it cannot. In common parlance, the one who writes or creates a work
is viewed as the author, and was so viewed at the time the Constitution was
drafted.' As Chief Justice Marshall stated in 1824, those "who framed our
constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they
said."71 It thus took a massive legal fiction for Congress to declare that for
copyright purposes the employer is an author of a work made for hire.
Simply creating a legal fiction that an employer is the author of a work for
hire does not mean that such fiction passes constitutional muster. As the

' NummER & NIMMER, supra note 49, at 1-66.24.
6 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 65, at 86.
0

M at 87. For the relevant language of the House report, NIMMER & NDiMER, supra note 49 at

App. 13-11.
' The standard English dictionary in use at the time the Constitution was drafted contained four
definitions of author," to wit: (1) "The first beginner or mover of anything; he to whom any thing owes
its original"; (2) "The efficient; he that effects or produces any thing"; (3) "The first writer of any thing;
distinct from the translator or compiler"; and (4) 'A writer in general." SAMUEL JOHNSON, A
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755).

" See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has stated: "The power to create presumptions is not a
means of escape from constitutional restrictions. " "
Although this issue has been noted in judicial opinions, it has never been
definitively ruled on. On occasion, however, dicta have suggested that the
term "authors" as used in the Copyright Clause may properly be interpreted
to include the owner of a work for hire. Thus, for example, the Second
Circuit has declared that: "Though the United States is perhaps the only
country that confers 'authorship' status on the employer of the creator of
a work for hire.

.

., its decision to do so is not constitutionally suspect. " "

It gave no basis for this conclusion, even though it recognized that "the
employer has shown skill only in selecting employees, not in creating
protectable expression," and that declaring an employer an author "seems
more like a justification for transfer of ownership than for recognition of
authorship."74
There is thus a clear dichotomy in the congressional treatment as to who
may obtain patents and copyrights. But the statutory requirement that
patents issue in the name of the inventor is consonant with the clear
meaning of the constitutional language. As the D.C. Circuit has declared,
there is a "constitutional objective of grantinga patent (or a reissue patent)
to the true inventor"5 which effectively precludes granting a patent in the
name of an assignee of the inventor's rights.
C. A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF NOVELTY

Implicit in the use of the terms "inventors" and "discoveries" in the
Patent Clause is the premise that before an exclusive right can be granted,
the discovery to be patented must be novel. Novelty is also implicit in the
statement of purpose, i.e., "to promote the progress of... useful arts."7 6
Simply put, novelty is a constitutional requirement.' Interestingly, it was

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911).
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 n.5, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (2d Cir. 1991).
'4 Id. at 506, 507 n.5.
's A.F. Stoddard & Co. v. Dann, 564 F.2d 556, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
76 Although certain commentators dispute it, a statement of purpose does indeed constitute a
constitutional limitation on patentability. See, e.g., WALTEPRSCHEID, supa note 42, at 154-65; and Paul
'

3

J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the LegislativePower The IntellectualPropertyClauseas an
Absolute Constrainton Congress, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2000).
" See Burchfiel, supra note 19, at 162. Cf Federico, supra note 27.
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not until 1966 that the Supreme Court so held, albeit in an indirect sense,
when it stated: "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already [publicly] available.""8 The requirement in the first United States patent legislation that in order to be
patentable a discovery be "not before known or used" 9 is simply an
incorporation of the constitutional requirement of novelty.
Regardless of whether a constitutional statement of purpose is viewed as
a limitation on the grant of authority, the constitutional requirement that
an invention must be novel to be patentable clearly arises out of the
definitions of "inventors" and "discoveries" that were in common use in
1787. Seidel points out that the most authoritative English dictionary of its
day was Samuel Johnson's A Dictionaryofthe English Languageand that the
fourth edition of this dictionary, published in 1818, "carries the word
meanings of the late 1700's. ""8 Johnson defined "inventor" as "one who
produces something new; a deviser of something not known before";81 and
"discovery" as "the act of finding anything hidden; the act of revealing or
disclosing any secret."82
At the end of the eighteenth century then, novelty was synonymous with
new, but new in what sense? Under the British practice at the time the
Constitution was drafted, novelty meant new in the realm. The fact that a
particular art or manufacture was known or practiced outside Great Britain
did not preclude its patentability, provided only that it was not known in
the country. Novelty thus had a very broad connotation, and originality
was only peripherally involved. This, of course, was what permitted patents
of importation under the English practice. 3
n Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6,148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966).
Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
, Arthur H. Seidel, The ConstitutionandaStandardofPatentability,48J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 5, ion. 11

(1966).
) Id at 13, n.17.
'2 Id at 15, n.19.
In Edgeberry v. Stephens, 2 Salk. 447, 1 Abbott's P.C. 8, 90 Eng. Rep. 1162 (King's Bench 1691),
the court held:
if the invention is new in England, a patent may be granted though the thing was
practiced beyond the sea before; for the statute [of Monopolies] speaks of new
manufactures within this realm; so that, if they be new here, it is within the statute;
for the act intended to encourage new devices, useful to the kingdom, and whether
learned by travel or by study it is the same thing.
In other words, novelty was not affected by what was known or used outside England, and "true and first
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In 1846 Hindmarch summarized the English law relating to novelty in
the following manner:
If the public once becomes possessed of an invention by any
means whatever, no subsequent patent for it can be granted,
either to the true and first inventor himself, or any other
person, for the public cannot be deprived of the right to use
the invention, and a patentee of the invention could not give
the public
any consideration to the public for the grant,
84
already possessing every thing he could give.
He went on to state:
The want of this requisite novelty in an art or invention
may... be established in any way which shows that the
public had a knowledge of the invention, or the means of
knowing it before the date of tbe patent. Public knowledge of
an invention may be shown by the existence of some public
record, or the publication of some work or paper before the
date of the patent, containing a description of the invention,-or by some public use of the invention prior to the
grant of the patent."
This was the law in Great Britain at the time the Constitution was drafted.
Novelty of an invention was determined not by what was known or used
or published in the rest of the world but by what was in public use, available
to the public, or published within Great Britain itself.
No delegate has left any record as to what the convention intended
"inventors" and "discoveries" to mean. Madison engaged in private
correspondence which appeared to suggest that he narrowly interpreted
these terms, but his rationale was less than clear. 6 The lack of any specific

inventor" in the Statute of Monopolies did not per se mean the original inventor. This remained the
common law in 1787 when the Constitution was drafted.
'4WILLIAM HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATIVE TO PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR THE
SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS: AND THE PRACTICE OF OBTAINING LETTER PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS,
WITH AN APPENDIX OF FORMS AND ENTRIES 21 (Harrisburg 1847).

Id at 66 (emphasis added).
"See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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interpretation by the delegates themselves is unfortunate because the
argument has been made that "[t]he statement that patents are to issue to
'inventors' for 'their discoveries' was clearly meant to prevent grants for
imported technology, the English 'patents of importation.' "87 It is not at all
obvious, however, that such a narrow scope of novelty was what the
Framers intended or even contemplated.
There is no reason to believe that they were not conversant with the fact
that the common law had interpreted "true and first inventor" as it appeared
in the Statute of Monopolies to include the first importer." Moreover, they
had chosen not to use the words "true and first" to modify "inventors."
Thus, on its face, the constitutional language seemed to suggest that an
exclusive right could be granted to someone who fell within the definition
of "inventor," but who was in actuality not the literal "true and first"
inventor. In addition, the commonly accepted definitions of "inventor" and
"discovery" in the late eighteenth century did not per se require novelty in
the modem sense. Simply put, there is nothing in the constitutional
language which obligated Congress to use statutory language that would
obligate an interpretation of novelty in any way materially different than the
contemporaneous British view that novelty was dependent on what was
known and used within the country.
Yet Congress thought it did. As a consequence, although it was not
immediately apparent, the new American patent law would not accept the
English interpretation of the limited relationship between originality and
novelty. Instead, to be patentable in the United States a discovery had to be
original to the inventor, i.e., not known or used anywhere in the world and
not merely in the United States.
The patent bill, H.R. 41, which ultimately became the Patent Act of
1790, was first read in the House on February 16, 1790.89 As introduced, the
phrase "not before known or used" therein was modified by "in the United
States" thereby clearly indicating that an invention known or used outside
the United States could be patented in the United States. To make this point
unequivocally, section 6 was added expressly stating that the first importer

' Karl B. Lutz, Are the Courts CarryingOut ConstitutionalPublicPolicy on Parents?,34 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 766, 773 (1952).
n Edgeberry, 90 Eng. Rep. 1162.
" H.R. 41 is reproduced in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES (L.G. De Pauw et al., eds., 1982) at 1623-37.
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of any art, machine, engine, device or invention, or any improvement
thereon should be treated as if he or she were the original inventor or
improver within the United States.
But this language would be short-lived, because during subsequent debate
the House and the Senate would delete both section 6 and "in the United
States." The congressional record is totally silent as to why these deletions
occurred. Historians have largely ignored this major-and in its time
radical-departure from the European patent custom and practice and have
failed totally to recognize that it was initiated in the House.' They have
also failed to address the question of why Congress chose to ignore
Washington's recommendation91 in so doing.9" But certain of Tench Coxe's
correspondence suggests that it came about primarily because of a concern
expressed by James Madison that patents of importation were unconstitutional.
On March 7, 1790, the day the House deleted section 6 from H.R. 41,
Rep. Thomas Fitzsimmons of Philadelphia wrote to Coxe, describing the
proceedings of the day. He stated in relevant part:
The bill for promoting Useful Arts has been so farr gon
thr. To be new Engrossed-& will probably go to the senate
in a day or two. Many alterations in Stile & some in
Substance has been made-Among which are some Suggested
in your Leter to me the 6th Section, allowing to Importers,
was left out, the Constitutional power being Questionable-

"Thus, for example, Ben-Atar gives a misleading impression in stating that "[t]he House... version
of the bill (i.e., the version passed by the House] followed English law in giving to the first importer of
technology the monopoly privileges accorded to original inventors." Doron Ben-Atar, Alexander
Hamilton's Akernati." Technology Piracyand the Report on Manufactures, 52 WM. & MARY Q., 403
(1995). It is quite possible that if the Senate had not deleted "within the United States" as a modifier to

"not before known or used" the courts would have interpreted this language as permitting patents of
importation, but Ben-Atar fails to note that the House deleted section 6 which would have expressly
authorized patents of importation and in so doing it dearly intended to preclude patents of importation.
For a detailed discussion of the enactment of the Patent Act of 1790, see E.C. Walterscheid, Charting a
Noel Coune" The Creation of tbe Patent Act of1790,25 AIPLA QJ. 445 (1997).
" On January 8, 1790, President Washington had recommended to Congress "the expediency of
giving effectual encouragement ... to the introduction of new and useful inventions from abroad, as to

the exertions of skill and genius in producing them at home." 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, supra note

253.
92

89, at

Ben-Atar actually raises the question but only in a rhetorical sense. See supra note 90, at 404.
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but if it is not the inconvenience is too Manifest of Admitting Patents in such Cases except some better guards could
be provided.9"
Fitzsimmons thus makes clear section 6 was deleted primarily because of
concerns raised about the constitutionality of patents of importation. He
does not indicate who raised the constitutional concerns or what their
nature was. But closely contemporaneous correspondence between Coxe
and Madison several weeks after the House action suggests that Madison was

largely-if not primarily-responsible for the refusal of Congress to
specifically authorize patents of importation in the Patent Act of 1790.
Two weeks after section 6 was deleted from H.R. 41 by the House, Coxe
wrote to Madison, saying:
I saw with regret the truth of your apprehension, that the
benefit of a patent could not be constitutionally extended to
imported objects-nor indeed, if it were within the verge of
the powers of Congress, do I think any clause [meaning
statutory provision] to that effect could be safely modified.
Private acts would be wise and safe, if they could be thought
constitutional; but I think they cannot without an Amendment, by striking out all of the clause that follows the word
"by" in the 8th parag. of the 8th Sec. of the first
Article-or something to that purpose."
How did Coxe know of Madison's concern that patents of importation were
unconstitutional, and why did he refer to "any clause to that effect"? The
answer is that he was closely following the progress of H.R. 41 because of

"' Letter from Rep. Thomas Fitzsimmons of Philadelphia to Tench Coxe (Mar. 7, 1790) (on file in
Coxe Papers, Incoming Box 20, Pennsylvania Historical Society). Coze's letter to Fitzsimmons is
missing, but the one thing Coxe did not desire was the deletion of section 6 from H.R. 41.
He was referring to the Patent Clause.
's Letter from Coxe to Madison (Mar. 21, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 111-14
(Charles F. Hobson et al., eds., 1981).
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his interest in obtaining patents of importation,' and thus was fully apprized
of the House action with respect to section 6.
In his response to Coxe on March 28th, Madison acknowledged his view
that patents of importation were unconstitutional. 9
There is no
contemporaneous record which expressly indicates what Madison's rationale
was for this view, and unfortunately neither Madison nor Coxe, nor
apparently anyone else, has set forth Madison's reasoning. Nowhere in his
voluminous writings did Madison indicate that the convention had ever
addressed the issue of patents of importation, and there is nothing in the
records of the convention, including Madison's Notes, which in any way
suggests that the Framers consciously intended to preclude Congress from
having authority to grant patents of importation. Nor does Madison ever
seem to have stated or otherwise indicated that the granting of patents of
importation would not promote the progress of useful arts and
manufactures.
Rather, implicit in his letter to Coxe is that his reasoning was predicated
on the perceived rejection by the convention of certain broader powers that
he and Charles Pinckney had proposed. If so, it was a short-lived approach

On January 17,1790 Coxe had written to George Clymer that "we" are about to apply for a patent
for various items of Richard Arkwright's fabulously successful cotton processing machinery developed
in England. He acknowledged that "we- were not original inventors of this machinery, and accordingly
urged Clymer to use his influence to ensure that the patent bill pending before Congress allowed patent
privileges for those who 'introduced" valuable foreign machinery. See A.F.C. Wallace & D.J. Jeremy,
William Pollardand the A rkwrigbt Patents,34 WM. & MARY Q. 404,409-11 (1977). Indeed, in his letter
to Madison he candidly stated that he possessed several objects, "some of wch. are not inventions, but
importations." Letter from oxe to Clymer, in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 95, at
113. He also told Madison that 'the Artist, who undertook to make the machine for spinning flax, hemp
& wool by water has completed the model &... it is now in my hands ready for an application for a
patent, which he will make as soon as the law shall pass." Id at 112. The "artist" was George Parkinson,
who was one of the "we" mentioned in Coxe's letter to Clymer on January 17.
'" In his March 21 letter to Madison, Coxe sought support for his (Coxe's) scheme to encourage the
diffusion of European technology to the United States by offering land premiums for the importation
of such technology. Madison now gave short shrift to such an idea, saying:
Your idea of appropriating a district of territory to the encouragement of imported
inventions is new and worthy of consideration. I cannot but apprehend however
that the clause in the constitutionwbicb forbids patentsfor this purpose will lie equally
in the way of your expedient. Congress seems to be tied down to the single mode
of encouraging inventions by granting the exclusive benefit of them for a limited
time, and therefore to have no more power to give a further encouragement out of
a fund of land than a fund of money. The Latitude of authority wished for was
strongly urged and expressly rejected.
Letter from Madison to Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 95, at
128.
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to constitutional interpretation. Within a few years, he would expressly
reject as the basis for constitutional interpretation the fact that a particular
proposal had been rejected by the convention.9 8 Several decades later, in
1832, he suggested that even though the convention had rejected certain
specific proposals with respect to congressional power, this did not mean
that the delegates did not intend for Congress to have broad equivalent
powers to protect and encourage domestic manufacture. 9 Although
Madison was speaking in the context of authority under the Commerce
Clause to place import duties on foreign manufactures, his argument is just
as applicable to interpreting the Patent Clause in the context of authority to
create patents of importation.
In 1790 and 1791, however, he seems to have been quite willing to
predicate constitutional interpretation on rejection of particular language by
the convention, with the result that the future course of the United States'
patent law was fundamentally changed. But being the erudite fellow that he
was, he quite likely was aware that the common law had interpreted "true
and first inventor" in the Statute of Monopolies as reading on one who first
imports as well as one who first invents. Why then did he refuse to accept
this common law interpretation and apply it to the constitutional language?
The most likely reason is that he was convinced that the Constitution had
not incorporated the common law as the law of the land,1a° as indeed it had

"See Jack N. Rakove, Madison and the Originsof Originalism,in ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 339-65 (New York 1996).
" As he put it:

The intention is inferred from the rejection or not adopting of particular
propositions which embraced a power to encourage them [i.e., domestic
manufactures]. But, without knowing the reasons for the votes in those cases, no
such inference can be sustained. The propositions might be disapproved because
they were in bad form or not in order; because they blended other powers with the
particular power in question; or because the object had been, or would be, elsewhere
provided for. No one acquainted with the proceedings of deliberative bodies can
have failed to note the frequent uncertainty of inferences from a record of naked
votes.

Letter from Madison to Professor Davis, in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 518,
520 (Max Farrand, ed., New Haven 1937).
' See Letter from Madison to Washington (Oct. 18, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 99, at 129-30 (containing Madison's explication of the common law
and its incorporation into the constitution).
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not,101 and he was not about to depend on the common law for an
interpretation of the meaning of any of the terms used in the Patent
Clause.0 2
As passed by the House, H.R. 41 retained the qualifier "in the United
States" to the phrase "not before known or used." The reason for this seems
to have been that in the press of business Madison and possibly others
addressed their concerns about constitutionality of patents of importation
only to section 6, apparently not realizing that retention of the qualifying
phrase would also authorize patents of importation. Because it agreed with
the House that the new patent statute should not authorize patents of
importation, the Senate deleted the qualifier."0 3 Aware that the House had
acted with insufficient precision, the Senate seems to have viewed this
amendment as merely one of house-keeping to implement the intent of the
House with which it concurred.
The result was that the first federal patent legislation did not contain
express language authorizing patents of importation, but neither did it
contain language expressly precluding such patents. The Act of 1790 was
replaced with new patent legislation which also provided no express
authorization for patents of importation, although it too did not expressly
preclude them. Instead, it retained the ambiguous language from the Act of
1790 that in order for an invention to be patentable it must be "not before
known or used." At the end of the eighteenth century, all other countries
with patent systems granted patents of importation as a means of promoting
the development of new industries within their borders. It was only in the
United States that such patents were being argued to be precluded by law.

0 Cf. Crosskey's view that 'the men of the Convention apparently considered the standing national
law of the United States to be the 'Common Law of England,' in all its applicable portions." WILLIAm
W. CROSSKEY, 1 POLrTICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 549 (1952).
'l Although the wording of his views on the Clause could be interpreted as suggesting that the
common law was indeed applicable to interpreting the Clause. See THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James
Madison).
0 Its reasons for doing so are nowhere found. It may have simply agreed with the constitutional
concerns. Alternatively, it may have believed there were other good and sufficient reasons why the
United States should not issue such patents. In this regard, note that Fitzsimmons had indicated to Coxe
that even in the absence of constitutional concerns, "the inconvenience is too manifest of admitting
patents in such cases except some better guards could be provided.' See supra note 93 and accompanying
text. Moreover, the Senate had received a copy of a petition by one Richard Wells which strongly
objected to patents of importation, primarily because he believed they would make it more difficult to
pirate English inventions. For a discussion of this petition, see E.C. Walterscheid, Patents and
Manufacturing in the Early Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 855, 875-77 (1998).
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the Act of 1790 or the Act of 1793 prohibited patents of importation, that
conclusion would soon be drawn from the interpretation given to novelty
under these Acts."°
It is interesting to note that at least part of the language of the Act of 1793
appears to have been intended by its sponsor to allow United States citizens
to obtain patents of importation, while precluding foreigners from doing so.
While the Act of 1790 had permitted anyone, citizen or not, to obtain a
patent, the Act of 1793 restricted patents to American citizens. Maryland
Congressman William H. Murray, who proposed this change, candidly
stated that its purpose was to prevent foreigners from obtaining patents in
the United States for inventions for which they had already obtained patents
in Europe "by which means the citizens of the United States might be
prevented from obtaining patents for the same or similar inventions."0 5
Inherent in this view was the supposition that U.S. citizens might indeed
properly obtain patents for inventions that had already been patented by
others in Europe.
There never would be a federal judicial opinion expressly holding that
patents of importation were unconstitutional. 1 6 But there was a state
opinion indicating this to be the case. In 1812 in Livingston v. Van Ingen07
a unanimous appellate court in New York held that federal patents of
importation were forbidden by the Constitution, but that this ban did not
apply to state patents of importation. The judges argued that the term
"inventors" as used in the Constitution was what precluded such patents,"'8

Conversely, however, for several decades to come, arguments would be presented that the United
States should indeed grant patents of importation because it was in her economic interest to do so. See,
eg., THOMAS GREENE FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS 213-16
(Boston 1810); JOSEPH COOPER, THE EMPOIUM OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 436 (Philadelphia 1813); and
I.L. SKINNER, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF IMPROVEMENTS IN THE USEFUL ARTS, AND MIRROR OF
THE PATENT OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (Washington 1828).
105Annals of Cong. 855-56 (1793).
10 The first reported United States patent case, decided in 1804, held that patents of importation were
precluded by American law, but gave no basis whatever for this holding. Reutgen v. Kanowrs, 20 F. Cas.
555, 556 (C.C.O. Pa. 1804). Subsequent cases would base such aholding on an interpretation of statutory
language in the Patent Act of 1793.
107 9 Johns. 507 (N.Y. 1812).
104

'0' Thus, Chief Justice Kent stated that 'it seems to be admitted that Congress are authorized to grant
patents only to inventors of the useful art. * * * There cannot, then, be any aid or encouragement, by
means of an exclusive right under the law of the United States, to importers from abroad of any useful
invention or improvement." Id at 583.
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although there is nothing to indicate that the Framers intended a more
narrow definition than that encompassed in the common law.' °9
As late as 1824, however, the Attorney General of the United States
contended that there was nothing in the Patent Clause that forbade federal
patents of importation. As he put it:
But it was argued that the power of Congress is limited to
inventors, and that the power to encourage by patents the
introduction of foreign discoveries, stands clear of this
constitutional grant. If it were necessary, this doctrine
might be questioned. The statute [of monopolies] uses the
same word with the constitution, "inventors"; and the
decisions upon the construction of this statute might be
referred to, in order to show that it has been considered as
embracing discoveries imported from abroad.11
But without any citation of authority, Story in his Commentaries published
in 1833 stated with respect to the Patent Clause: "The power, in its terms,
is confined to authors and inventors; and cannot be extended to the
introducers of any new works or inventions.""' He thus accepted the view
that the literal language of the Constitution, i.e., its use of the term
"inventors," precluded patents of importation.
If patents of importation were precluded by the literal language of the
Patent Clause as Story indicated, a New York court opined, and Madison
appeared to believe,' then the Clause obligated a narrow interpretation of

" The common law interpreted the phrase "true and first inventor" in the Statute of Monopolies
to include the first introducer as well as the original inventor. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
Moreover, as Cohen notes, "the framers of the Constitution were generally fluent in Latin and... the
Latin word 'inventor' means 'one who finds out, a contriver, author, discoverer (from the verb 'invenio'
meaning sensu stricto, 'Icome upon,' 'I find,' 'I discover')...." See I. BERNARD COHEN, SCIENCE AND
THE FouNDING FATHERS 241 (New York 1995). Originality was not a requirement.
I10Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 173 (1824).
...
JOSEPHSTORY, COMMENTARIESONTH ECONSITUTIONOFTHEUNrrEDSTATES 51153 (Boston

1833).
112Although Madison's letter to Coxe seemed to indicate that his belief that patents of importation
were unconstitutional was predicated on the rejection by the convention of proposals that were
sufficiently broad to encompass such patents, implicit in any such view was that the terms "inventors"
and 'discoveries" as used in the Clause must be construed to refer only to one who is the first and original
discoverer of the subject matter for which an exclusive right is sought. Otherwise, there was nothing to

prevent "inventor" to be defined as including the first introducer or importer.
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novelty and a broad interpretation of what constitutes an anticipation
precluding patentable novelty. While early judicial opinions would indeed
conclude that novelty under the United States patent law meant new and
original with respect to the world at large, and not merely the United States,
they would do so on the basis of an interpretation of certain language of the
Patent Act of 1793 and not on any interpretation of "inventors" and
"discoveries" as used in the Patent Clause. As a result, novelty in the United
States would come to have quite a different meaning than it had under the
existing common law. Specifically, originality would be interpreted to be a
fundamental component of novelty in the United States, i.e., the invention
would have to be both new and original, not only in the United States but
in the entire world.
The legislative history of the Patent Act of 1790 seemed to suggest that
the phrase "not before known or used" was intended to mean not before
known or used anywhere in the world and not simply in the United States."'
But this legislative history was not known or reported, and even if it had
been, it would not have been considered relevant under the rules of statutory
construction then in vogue." 4 Instead, the courts would ultimately rely
upon other language in the Act of 1793, i.e., "not originally discovered by
the patentee,""' to hold that what is now termed "prior art" is not limited
6
to that known or used in the United States.1
These holdings were not predicated on any supposed contemporary
definition of "inventors" and "discoveries" in the manner that the New York
judges had in Livingston v. Van Ingen in 1812 when they declared that the
Patent Clause precluded federal patents of importation." 7 If there had been
any general feeling that "in common parlance" the terms "inventors" and
"discoveries" in the Constitution precluded any expansive definition of
patentable novelty, it would have been extremely easy for federal judges to
say so, but they did not. Indeed, Chief Justice Marshall, when given the
opportunity, refused to interpret the terms "inventors" and "discoveries" as
they appear in the Patent Clause, and instead relied on statutory language to

113
114

Walterscheid, s"pra note 90.
See, e.g., H.J. Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 897

(1985) ("The modern practice of interpreting a law by reference to its legislative history was almost
wholly nonexistent .... *).
.. Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, I Star. 318, at S 6.
116 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 513-14 (1818).
117 See supra notes 107 and 108 and the accompanying text.
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require that patentable invention be both new and original."' Thus, the
American emphasis on originality as a fundamental component of novelty
originated in statutory interpretation and not as the result of any
interpretation of the constitutional language. All that the Patent Clause
literally requires is that the invention be new in the United States in order
to be patentable. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that in light of the
rapid information transfer and retrieval now available worldwide that the
Supreme Court would interpret novelty under the Clause as requiring
originality."1
D. A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF INVENTION

Accepting that novelty is a constitutional requirement for patentability,
is there any higher standard set forth in the Patent Clause than simple
novelty with regard to what may be declared to be patentable invention? In
the middle third of the twentieth century, justices of the Supreme Court
began, for the first time, to argue that there was." 0 The first intimation of
this view occurred in 1941 in Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp. where Justice Douglas for the Court declared the invention in question
not to be patentable because the inventor's "skill in making this
contribution" failed to reach "the level of inventive genius which the
Constitution (Art. I, S 8) authorizes Congress to reward."' He pointed to
no particular language of the Patent Clause obligating a specific "level of
inventive genius" before a patent could be proper.
A year later, Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissenting in Exhibit
Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., seemed to suggest that the constitutional
meaning of "inventors" and "discoveries" were somehow dependent on how
individual justices viewed the intrinsic worth of the particular invention."
But it was in 1950 that Justices Douglas and Black, concurring in Great

. See supra note 116.
' Thus the present patent statute defining originality as an essential component of novelty for
purposes of patentability would likely in an appropriate circumstance be judicially treated as
constitutionally required. See 35 U.S.C. S 102 (West 2001).
' This despite the fact that in 1891 the Court had declared that the term "invention" "cannot be
defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not." McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
...
314 U.S. 84,91, 51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 272 (1941).
w See supra note 25.
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Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., really got the
attention of the patent bar, with their constitutional theory that "every
patent case involving validity represents a question which requires reference
to a standard written into the Constitution." In their view, that standard is
imposed by the statement of purpose in the Patent Clause."' Had they
stopped there, their views would have been controversial, but not
historically absurd. But they went- much further and argued that
constitutionally "an invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of
science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to
make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge. * * * The
Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a
higher end-the advancement of science."12 The only supposed authority
cited for this view was certain earlier references by members of the Court
to variations on the phrase "inventive genius" in a number of earlier
opinions.12 But until Cuno the Court had never suggested that "inventive
genius" was a constitutional standard for patentability, and even then there
had been no suggestion that "advancement of science" was a constitutional
requirement for patentability.
Such a view had never seriously been suggested by anyone, and besides
reading the phrase "useful arts" out of the Clause, it relied on a totally
anachronistic interpretation of "science" as used in the Clause.u Quiet
likely for these reasons, the Court has declined to read into the Clause any
requirement that scientific advancement is a predicate for patentability.
It has, however, accepted their view that the introductory language of the
Clause sets forth a constitutional standard of patentability. Thus, in 1966,
in Graham v. John Deere Co. the Court relied heavily on the introductory
,23 340 U.S. 147,154, 87 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (1950). They had actually initially taken this position
five years earlier in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 381, 64 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 525 (1945) ("The
purpose 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts'... provides the standards for the exercises

of the power and sets the limits beyond which it may not go.").
114 340 U.S. at 155.
u5See

id. at 155, n. 1.

126 Douglas and Black contended that "[t]he invention, to justify a patent, had to serve the ends of

science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the like; to make a distinctive contribution
to scientific knowledge." 340 U.S. at 154. Burchfiel calls this statement "[plerhaps the most egregious
recent example of judicial 'flailure to recognize the difference between modern and circa-1800 usage' "
(citing to Powell, supra note 114, at 896 n.56). See Burchfiel, spra note 19, at 214. Prager iseven more
blunt, saying: "This was about as dearly wrong as a judicial opinion on an intricate manner can possibly
be. It was based on a complete disregard for the constitutional promotion of the useful arts." See Frank
D. Prager, StandardsofPatentableInventionfrom 1474 to 1952, 20 U. CI. L. REV. 69, 86 (1952).
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language to support its view that there is a constitutional standard of
invention that must be met for there to be patentability. It began by noting
that the qualified authority given to Congress with regard to the issuance of
patents "is limited to the promotion of advances in the 'useful arts,' " and
went on to state:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available. Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must "promote the Progress of...
useful Arts." This is the standardexpressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that
patent validity "requires reference to a standard written into
127
the Constitution."
In so stating, the Court accepted the earlier view of Justices Douglas and
Black that the Patent Clause sets forth a constitutional standard of
patentability but "clearly rejected any reading of the intellectual property
clause that would require that an invention advance the frontiers of natural
science. " "'
In 1969 the Court reiterated the views it had expressed in Grahamv. John
Deere Co. but did not amplify upon them or explain them. 129 Nor has it
done so since then. In the Court's view something more than simple
novelty is constitutionally required, but what that something is-aside from
encompassing "innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum

ur 383 U.S. 1, 5-6(1966) (citing the concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and Black in A. & P. Tea

Co. v. Supermarket Corp.).
1,n
1

Burchfiel, supra note 19, at 164.
Anderson's Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57, 61, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

673 (1969).
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of useful knowledge"-is unclear. Needless to say, these terms are not
particularly helpful in defining a constitutional standard of invention.
Despite the Court's failure to give any indication what is intended by the
quoted language, commentators 3 ' have generally assumed that it elevated to
constitutional status the "general condition for patentability""' first stated
in 1851 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.' There the Court declared that "unless
more ingenuity and skill... were required... than were possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of
that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of
every invention."'
As the Graham Court pointed out: "In practice,
Hotchkiss has required a comparison between the subject matter of the
patent, or patent application, and the background skill of the calling. It has
been from this comparison that patentability was in each case
determined."' 4
In 1952 Congress first set forth the present statutory requirement that in
order to be patentable the subject matter of an invention must be
nonobvious, saying:
A patent may not be obtained... if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."
In Graham the Court concluded that this language "was intended merely as
a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition, with
congressional directions that inquiries into the obviousness of the subject

' See, e.g., Burchfiel, supra note 19; Edward S. Irons & Mary Helen Sears, The Constitutional
Standardoflnvention-The ToucstoneforPatentReform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653; Albert B. KimballJr.,
An Analysis ofRecent Supreme CourtAssertions Regardinga ConstitutionalStandardofInvention, 1 AM.
PAT.L. ASS'N Q.J. 204 (1973); and Joel Rosenblatt, The ConstitutionalStandardfor 'OrdinarySkill in the
Art," 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 435 (1972).
13 383 U.S. at 11.
132 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
" 52 U.S. at 267.
134 383 U.S. at 12.
133 35 U.S.C. S 103 (2001).
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matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to patentability." 3 6 If the
Hotchkiss "condition" is a constitutional requirement, as various
commentators have inferred,'37 then it followed that the language
"innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge" in Graham was intended to mean that the statutory requirement
of unobviousness for patentability was also a constitutional requirement.
While not expressly so stating, the Court certainly seemed to infer this when
it declared "[t]he emphasis on nonobviousness is one of inquiry, not
quality, 138and, as such, comports with the constitutional strictures."' 39
Congress, however, has not interpreted Graham as setting forth a
constitutional requirement for nonobviousness. Thus, in 1996 it amended
the patent statute to eliminate the nonobviousness requirement for some
biotechnological processes."
Heald and Sherry, while conceding that
nonobviousness was not a requirement for patentability under British law
at the time the Constitution was drafted, nonetheless argue that something
more than mere novelty was required and that this something more was
incorporated into the Patent Clause."' They are correct, but that something
more was a constitutional requirement for utility, which will be
subsequently discussed.'
In otherwise setting forth a statutory requirement that an invention be
unobvious in order to be patentable, Congress had gone further and also
stated that "[p]atentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made."' The Graham Court noted that it "seems apparent
that Congress intended" by this language "to abolish thetest it believed this
Court announced in the controversial phrase 'flash of creative genius,' " in
Cuno.'" If there was a certain "level of creative genius" required by the

383 U.S. at 17.
See supra note 130.
t This certainly seemed to indicate disagreement with the views of Justices Douglas and Black that
17

"advancement of science" was a constitutional requirement. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
"' 383 U.S. at 17.
1 According to 35 U.S.C. S 103(b)(1) (2001), a "biotechnological process using or resulting in a
composition of matter that is novel under section 102 and nonobvious under subsection (a)of this section
shall be considered nonobvious if [the composition of matter and process are claimed in the same patent
application and are owned by the same person]."

M Heald & Sherry, supra note 76, at 1186-87.
'4' See infra Part IM.E.
143 35 U.S.C. S 103 (2001).
14 383 U.S. at 15.
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Constitution, as Justice Douglas' opinion in Cuno certainly seemed to
suggest, then Congress clearly did not have authority to negate such a
requirement by statutory enactment, and any statutory language seeking to
do so would be unconstitutional.
To avoid this problem, the GrahamCourt now sought to "explain" Cuno
as nothing more than a "rhetorical embellishment" which "merely
rhetorically restated the requirement that the subject matter sought to be
patented must be beyond the skill of the calling." According to the Graham
Court, in Cuno "[i]t was the device, not the invention, that had to reveal the
'flash of creative genius.' "14 Never mind that in Cuno the device was the
invention.' Be that as it may, the Graham Court sought to indicate that
the Cuno standard and the one it was pronouncing were basically the same.
In essence, invention did not depend on the state of mind of the inventor,
i.e., invention could be made accidentally as well as deliberately, and
invention, regardless of how made, was patentable as long as it was
unobvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.
This was well and good, but what was the basis for the Hotchkiss test as
originally set forth in 1851? The Hotchkiss Court cited no authority, judicial
or statutory, for the test it set forth, as indeed it could not, for there was
none. 47 Moreover, the Hotchkiss Court made no reference to any
constitutional basis for the test. Rather it engaged in an early case of judicial
14
activism predicated neither on statutory nor constitutional interpretation.
The Graham Court thus found itself in a quandary in attempting to
establish a historical basis for its interpretation of the Patent Clause as
establishing a constitutional standard of invention beyond simple novelty.

383 U.S. at 15-16 n.7.
Instead of engaging in such semantics (some would call it sophistry), the Court would have been
better served by never having included this supposed distinction between 'the device" and 'the
invention."
"4The Graham Court noted that the ultimate determination in Hotchkiss, namely, that substitution
of porcelain or clay for wood or metal in doorknobs did not constitute a patentable invention, "flows
directly" from one of the rules followed by the Patent Board under the Act of 1790. 383 U.S. at 11 n.4.
However, the Court failed to note that the particular "rule" was never publicly disclosed while it was
supposedly in effect, had never been incorporated into any subsequent statutory enactment, and had never
been followed or even mentioned in any judicial proceeding at the time that Hotchkiss was decided.
Indeed, it is highly unlikely that the Hotchkiss Court was even aware that any such rule had ever existed
during the brief period that the Patent Act of 1790 was in effect.
"' In so doing, it effectively usurped the legislative authority of Congress which alone has authority
to set the conditions for patentability, provided only that it acts within the restraints imposed by the
constitutional language.
"'
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It had no contemporaneous documentation by any of the Framers to set
forth their interpretation of the introductory language of the Clause, nor did
it have any other contemporaneous documentation relating to the
introductory language. Consequently, it turned to an imaginative-and in
many ways incorrect-reconstruction of the views of Jefferson based on
letters written over a period of twenty-six years as somehow representing
the views and intentions of the Framers with regard to interpretation of the
Patent Clause."'
The gist of its argument was that Jefferson (and presumably the Framers)
favored a high standard of patentability," ° that Jefferson and the patent
board which issued patents under the Act of 1790 believed "that the courts
should develop additional conditions for patentability," and that Congress
apparently agreed with such an approach."' This argument that Congress
agreed that interpretation of the constitutional standard of invention should
be determined by judicial activism was developed by negative implication.
Despite numerous other changes to the patent statutes between 1790 and
1950 Congress set no statutory requirements for patentability "beyond the
bare novelty and utility tests reformulated" in the Act of 1793.152 Why the
failure of Congress to set a higher standard of patentability than merely
novelty and utility was deemed to be proof that Congress had chosen to
defer to judicial activism to set additional standards of patentability was not
apparent or obvious.5 ' In any case, the relevance of this to the delineation
of a constitutional standard of invention was not indicated.
The Graham Court's reliance on the supposed views of Thomas Jefferson
has been sharply challenged. 5 The challenge has been on three levels. The
first is that with the exception of his exchange of correspondence with
1'9 383 U.S. at 7-11.
" As the Court put it, "Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small details, obvious
improvements, or frivolous devices.
patentability." 383 U.S. at 9.
151383 U.S. at 10.

His writings evidence his insistence upon a high level of

152Id

.. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument suggests that the failure of Congress to be more
restrictive than the limitations set in any of the enumerated grants of power permits the Court to set
more restrictive standards whenever it sees fit. In other words, this is an argument for a grant of
legislative power to the Court which plays havoc with the separation of powers doctrine.
i" See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use andAbuse of History: The Supreme Court's Interpretationof
Thomas Jeffeson's Influence on the Patent Law,39 IDEA 195 (1999) (stating the Court has overrated
Jefferson's influence on the early development and interpretation of the patent law through selective use
of the historical record); Burchfiel, supra note 19, at 165-67, 209, and 212.
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Madison in 1787-1789,1"s none of his letters pertaining to patent matters ever
mention the Patent Clause, much less seek to interpret it. Secondly, there
is nothing whatever to indicate that the views held by Jefferson were those
of the Framers themselves or those of either the first federal Congresses or
the early federal judiciary,"' or, for that matter, the general populace." 7 In
this regard, the Graham Court completely ignored the rejection by the
second federal Congress of Jefferson's proposal that a good defense to
infringement should be that the invention "is
so unimportant and obvious
that it ought not to be the basis of an exclusive right."" 8 Thirdly, in a
number of instances the Court either misstated Jefferson's role"5 9 or took his
views out of context or attributed views to him that he did not hold. Thus,
for example, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court, Jefferson did
not think "that the courts should develop additional conditions for
patentability."160 Rather, his views were just the opposite, and he clearly
thought that judges were ill-equipped for this responsibility. 6 ' Perhaps most

"' SeeLetterfromThomasJefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), letter from Thomas Jefferson
to James Madison (July 31, 1788), letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), and
letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 1 THE REPUBuC OF LETrERS 17761790, at 511, 543, 566 and 627 (James Morton Smith ed.) (1995) (Jefferson stated that he would be pleased
if the Constitution would allow for their own literary works and their own inventions for a term not
exceeding _ years). Editors note: Jefferson did not specify the number of years.
156 Burchfiel, supra note 19, at 166 and 167.
1s As Burchfiel puts it, 'by basing its analysis on the privately expressed personal views of a single

historical figure and by extending those views to the historical American populace in general, the Court
acted as if it were in possession of an eighteenth-century opinion poll without margin for error." Id at
212.
I'$See WALTERsCHEID, supra note 45, at 200-06. According to Burchfiel, "Itihe legal evidence is
uncontradicted that in rejectingJefferson's proposals, including a statutory nonobviousness standard, the
second Congress disavowed the proposition that a high standard of patentability was required by the
plain meaning of the patent clause or by the original intent of the constitutional framers." Burchfiel,
supra note 19, at 209.
'" Contrary to the Court's repeated assertion, Jefferson did not draft the Patent Act of 1793.
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 45, at 202-12.
160 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966).
.. In 1813 Jefferson wrote:
Instead of refusing a patent in the firt instance, as the board was authorized to do,
the patent now issues of course, subject to be declared void on such principles as
should be established by the courts of law. This business, however, is but little
analogous to their course of reading, since we might in vain turn over all the
lubberly volumes of the law to find a single ray which would lighten the path of the
mechanic or the mathematician. It is more within the information of a board of
academical professors, and a previous refusal of patent would better guard our
citizens against harassment by lawsuits.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
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critically, the Graham Court's assertion that Jefferson "clearly recognized
the social and economic rationale of the patent system" is belied by the
historical record.'62
The view that the introductory language of the Clause serves to limit or
qualify congressional patent power in any way, much less establish a
constitutional standard of invention as stated by the Graham Court, has also
been strongly challenged.163 Pragmatically, the effect of such an argument
is to read the introductory language out of the Clause and to render it
meaningless. It is also contrary to the well-established principle that, to the
extent possible, legislative language must be read so as to give effect to all of
its parts without doing violence to any." But saying that the introductory
language qualifies the congressional patent power does not per se suggest that
it creates a constitutional standard of invention above and beyond the
requirement of novelty. 6
It does suggest, however, that it qualifies

JEFFERSON 326, 336-37 (Andrew A. Lispcomb et al., eds.) (1904). A year later, he would emphasize the
point, arguing that "when so new a branch of science has been recently engrafted on our jurisprudence,
one with which its professors have till now had no call to make themselves acquainted, one bearing little
analogy to their professional education or pursuits," one or two decisions before inferior and local
tribunals should not act as precedent to *forever foreclose the whole of the new subject." Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to Oliver Evans (Jan. 14, 1814), in 14 THE WrITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra
at 63, 67.
"2 While the Court clearly recognized that in 1788 and 1789 Jefferson had opposed the Patent Clause,
Graham,383 U.S. at 7-8, it failed completely to note that more than two decades later, in 1813 and 1814,
he was still not convinced of either the usefulness or the desirability of the patent system. In 1813, he
expressed skepticism about the value of patents in the following terms: "generally speaking, other nations
have thought that these monopolies produce more embarrassment than advantage to society; and it may
be observed that the nations which refuse monopolies of invention, are as fruitful as England in new and
useful devices." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13,1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 161, at 334. In 1814 he reiterated his concern that, on balance, the
abuses of the patent system through the issuance of what he called "frivolous" patents outweighed its
benefits. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Cooper (Jan. 16, 1814), in 14 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra at 54, 61. It seems apparent that the principle applies with equal force to
constitutional language, even though the Court has never expressly so indicated.
1" See Burchfiel, supra note 19 (stating that the only way the Court concluded that the Framers
intended both a grant of power and a limitation was by ignoring the actual history of the first patent acts
and their construction by the Supreme Court); Kenneth J. Burchfiel, The ConstitutionalIntellectual
PropertyPower: Progress of Usefid Arts and the Legal Protection of Semriconductor Technology, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 473 (1988); Albert B. Kimball, Jr., An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions
Regardinga ConstitutionalStandardof Invention, 1 AM. PAT. L. AS'N Q.J. 204 (1973).
SSee, eg., Mastro Plasticsv. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950);
United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940); and United States v. Boisdore's Heirs,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 113 (1850). It seems apparent that the principle applies with equal force to
constitutional language, even though the Court has never expressly so indicated.
"' More recently, however, that seems to be exactly what the Court is implying, although not
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congressional power in other ways.' 66 I turn now to one way it does so,
namely, by creating a constitutional requirement for utility.
E. UTILMIY AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT

In the patent law, "utility" is synonymous with "usefulness." In 1966 in
Brennerv. Mansonthe Supreme Court stated that it is indisputable that "one
may patent only that which is 'useful'" and
the concept of utility has maintained a central place in all of
our patent legislation, beginning with the first patent law in
1790 and culminating in the present laws provision that
'Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
1 67
title.'
It emphasized that "[t]he basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit
derived by the public from an invention with substantial utility."'"
I shall look more carefully at what the Court meant by "substantial
utility"; it will suffice for the moment to note that the Court indicated that
utility is a constitutional requirement and not merely a statutory one. In so
indicating, however, it failed to suggest what language of the Patent Clause
created such a requirement. In his dissent, however, Justice Harlan certainly
inferred that the requirement resides in the introductory language "[t]o

expressly stating. Thus in 1989 it declared that "[t]he novelty and nonobviousness requirements of
patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself (emphasis
supplied), that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the
exception." Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
" One specific way it does so is by limiting the term which Congress may grant for patents. Indeed,
Justice Story made this point as early as 1829 in Pennock v.Dialoguewhen he stated that the 'main object"
of the patent system authorized by the Clause 'was 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts'";
an object that could best be accomplished by giving the invention to the public "atas early a period as
possible." 27 U.S. at 19.
" 383 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1966) (citing to various patent acts beginning with the Act of April 10, 1790
and to 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1964)). This definition remains the law today.
16 Id. at 534.
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promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 69 In other words, to
promote the useful arts requires the patented invention to have utility, but
what kind of utility? To quote the Brenner majority, "a simple, everyday
word [i.e., "useful"] can be pregnant with ambiguity when applied to the
facts of life." 70 The difficulty was that Congress had never sought to define
what it (or the Constitution for that matter) meant by "useful."
The question of the meaning of "useful" seems to have been first raised
in 18 17 when it was argued that it meant "of general utility," i.e., better than
existing devices of the type patented. Not so, said Justice Story in his
capacity as circuit judge:
By useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as
may be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the morals,
the health, or the good order of society. It is not necessary
to establish, that the invention is of such general utility, as
to supercede all other inventions now in practice to
accomplish the same purpose. It is sufficient, that it has no
obnoxious or mischievous tendency, that it may be applied
to practical uses, and that so far as it is applied, it is salutary.
* * * The law... does not look to the degree of utility; it

simply requires that it shall be capable of use, and that the
use is such as sound morals and policy do not
discountenance or prohibit.""
Story's view that the utility must be socially beneficial, that is to say, not
illegal, immoral, or adverse to public policy,"" was generally followed into
the twentieth century, primarily in two areas: gambling devices (including
inventions that could be used as a part of such a device)173 and inventions
9 Ia at 536.
110 id. at 529.

"l Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817); see also Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Gas. 1018, 1019
(C.C.D. Mass. 1817). Story repeated his views in an appendix to Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 12,
24 (1818).
In As examples, he stated "a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to
facilitate private assassination, is not a patentable invention." Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
'7' See, eg., Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. IMI.1936); Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278
F. 512 (7th Cir. 1922); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448 (N.D. Cal. 1897); and Nat'l Automatic Device Corp.
v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (N.D. Ill.
1889).
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(including medicines) intended to defraud.174 Also falling into this broad
category are the utterly worthless or frivolous"' patents, for example, those
sought for perpetual motion machines.176 There has, however, in recent
years been a marked reluctance of courts to invalidate patents for lack of
utility based on social benefit or morality arguments.' "
In 1999 the Federal Circuit cited to Brenner as support for the view:
"The threshold of utility is not high: An invention is 'useful' . . . if it is
capable of providing some identifiable benefit.""' Unfortunately, Brenner
does not support any such view, stating as it does a constitutional
requirement of "substantial utility." 79 Until Brenner, Story's conclusion
that as long as the invention has some utility, it does not have to accomplish
its purpose better than taught in the existing art, was treated as the law."80
But Brenner's statement that "substantial utility" is required for patentability
under the Constitution seemed to challenge this conclusion. But if
"substantial utility" was required by the Constitution, Brennerprovided no
indication of how such a standard was to be defined. 8' As a practical matter
in the years since Brenner courts have made no attempt to apply the

U4 See, eg., Scott & Williams v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir.
1925) (seamless stocking
with structure on the back that imitated a seamed stocking); and Richard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868 (2d Cir.
1900) (process for making cigar wrapper resemble a higher quality tobacco leaf. For a discussion of the
higher standard of utility imposed in health-related inventions, see Brand, Utility in a Pharmaceutical

Patent, 39 FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 480 (1984).

This was a popular term of derision for worthless patents in the early nineteenth century.
See, e-g., Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (perpetual motion machine); In re
Perrigo, 48 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (method and apparatus for accumulating and transforming ether
electric energy); and Ex parte Heicklin, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1463 (1990) (method to retard the aging
process).
' See, e.g.,Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1700 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (rejecting argument that claimed invention was immoral because it was designed to make
people believe something that was not true); and In re Murphy, 1977 WL 22879,200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 801
(Bd. App. 1977) (overturning rejection predicated solely on the ground that the device sought to be
patented was useful solely for gambling purposes). The Federal Circuit in Juicy Whip declared that 'the
principle that inventions are invalid if they are principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes
has not been applied broadly in recent years." 185 F.3d at 1366.
"n Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366.
"t
"6

'"

Brenner, 383 U.S. at 534.

The Brenner majority dismissed Story's views as requiring it to do no more than to decide whether
the invention is "frivolous and insignificant" which it believed no easier to decide than the one it was
addressing. 383 U.S. at 533.
. It is interesting to note that Brenner and Grahamwere both decided by the same Court in 1966
and both failed to indicate the nature of the heightened standard for patentability said to be required by
the Constitution.
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"substantial utility" criterion set forth therein or to require that an invention
2
must somehow have more utility than taught in the existing art.1
The terms "useful" and "discoveries" as they appear in the Patent Clause
are susceptible of very broad meanings or interpretations. In the absence of
any indication that the Framers intended them to be narrowly interpreted,
it is reasonable to suppose that how broadly they were to be interpreted was
left to the discretion of Congress. While Congress from the inception of the
patent law has made some attempt to define "discoveries," at least indirectly
through a definition of patentable subject matter,13 it has never sought to
provide any definition whatever of "useful" aside from the requirement that
an invention be useful to be patentable. Thus in the absence of any
indication to the contrary, a presumption exists that Congress intended
"useful" to be read as broadly in the patent statutes as it appears in the Patent
Clause.' 4
The Brenner majority, however, applied just the opposite presumption.
In its view, if utility or usefulness is read so broadly "as to allow the
patenting of any invention not positively harmful to society, it places such
a special meaning on the word 'useful' that we cannot accept it in the
absence of evidence that Congress so intended."' The Court carefully failed
to note that this supposedly "special" meaning of "useful" is in fact fully in
accord with the dictionary definition of the term, and instead drew the
remarkable conclusion that in the absence of specific evidence that Congress
intended to use the term in accordance with its dictionary definition, such
a definition of the term could not apply to it as used in the patent statute.

'" See, e.g., Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 960 n.12, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1196, 1199 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is possible for an invention to be less effective than existing
devices but nevertheless meet the statutory criteria for patentability.*).
'" See Brenner, 383 U.S. at 528-29 (citing to various patent acts beginning with the Act of April 10,
1970 and to 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1964)).
," Justice Harlan, concurring in par and dissenting in part in Brenner,certainly so argued. 383 U.S.
at 536-37. Kreiss argues that the "useful arts' subject matter requirement is distinct from the
constitutional requirement that an invention be "useful" in order to be patentable. In his view, both the
Patent Office and judges have "confused and conflated" the two. In particular, he suggests that Judge
Newman, dissenting in In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,297,30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1455, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
improperly equated the two by stating that patentable subject matter must be within the "technological

arts' before the claimed subject matter could be demonstrated to be 'useful." Robert A. Kreiss, Patent
Protectionfor ComputerProgramsandMatbematicalAlgoritbhms:ConstitutionalLimitations on Patentable
Subject Matter, 29 N.M. L. REV. 31, 74-75 (1999). But the only basis for a constitutional utility
requirement for patentability is the constitutional language requiring the purpose of a patent to be to
promote the progress of the useful arts.
"' 383 U.S. at 533.
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This, of course, is the exact opposite of the usual approach taken to
interpreting statutory language.
Be that as it may, the specific holding in Brenner was that a new and
unobvious process for creating a chemical compound did not have patentable
utility in the absence of a showing of patentable utility for the compound
thus created. It is important to note that holding was predicated on
statutory interpretation and not on interpretation of the constitutional
meaning of "useful" in the Patent Clause.
IV. PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER

To what extent, if any, does the Patent Clause limit or circumscribe
congressional discretion to define patentable subject matter? In the absence
of any Supreme Court interpretation of the meaning to be given to either
"inventors" or "discoveries" as these terms appear in the Clause or of any
record as to what the Framers intended these terms to mean,18 6 it is
reasonable to turn to the definitions of these terms used at the end of the
eighteenth century when the Constitution was ratified. Those definitions
were exceedingly broad,"'7 and in and of themselves gave Congress wide and
apparently unlimited discretion to define patentable subject matter.'
But if, as I have earlier suggested, terms in the Clause cannot be read or
interpreted in isolation, and if the introductory language qualifies the patent
power given to Congress as the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.
most emphatically stated it does,' then a plausible argument can be made
that the power of Congress to define patentable subject matter is not
plenary, but rather is constrained "to the promotion . . . of useful arts."
That is to say, patentable subject matter constitutionally must be that which

'4 Seidel, for example, notes that [n]o historical writings or events have been found analyzing the
(Clause]." See Seidel, sra note 80.
'v See Seidel, supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
I use the phrase "patentable subject matter* in the same manner that Adelman et al. use "patenteligibility," namely, "to describe the subject matter open to patenting, as opposed to the word
'patentability.' The latter term implies not just that the subject matter is appropriate under the statute,
but that the invention has been approved following an individual determination of novelty,
nonobviousness and the other requisites." MARTiN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PATENT LAW 83 (St. Paul 1998).
11 See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (citing to the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas and
Black in A.
&P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.).
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promotes the useful arts. This in turn requires a closer look at what is
meant by "useful arts" in the Clause."9
Again, however, the Framers provided no indication of what they meant
by this term.19' Seidel suggests that in 1787 it meant useful or helpful
trades." According to Coulter, "[i]t seems clear that 'useful arts' (as a
unitary technical term) embraced the so-called industrial, mechanical and
manual arts of the 18th century. . ."". Lutz, in turn, thinks it is just as
clear "that 'useful arts' meant what we now call 'technology,' or 'applied
science. ' ' 9' He argues that the words "useful arts" were deliberately used to
broaden the field of patentable subject matter from "new manufactures" as
used in the Statute of Monopolies because "[b]y the year 1787 it was being
recognized even in Great Britain that the phrase 'new manufactures' was an
unduly limited object for a patent system, since it seemed to exclude new
processes. " '" Lutz may be correct in this regard, but there is no
contemporaneous documentation to indicate that the Framers either
understood or intended a distinction of this type.
The statutory definition of patentable subject matter has changed but
little since the Patent Act of 1790. That Act authorized patents for "any
useful Art, Manufacture, Engine, Machine, or Device, or any improvement
therein."" % The Act of 1793 changed this to read "any new and useful art,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement [therein]."'9 This definition of patentable subject matter was

" The point was made as early as 1952 when Coulter emphasized that: "The startingpointofinquiry
as to the field of subject matter embraced hy the statutoryproviso sbould be this Constitutionalreference to
'usefulArts'(emphasisin the original)." Robert I. Coulter, The Fieldofthe Statutory UsefulArts, 34J. PAT.
OFF. SoC'Y 487 (1952). More recently the Supreme Court has stated: "The subject matter provisions of
the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting
'the Progress of Science and the useful Arts ...... Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315, 206
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
...
I have elsewhere suggested that the words "useful arts" were suggested to the Framers by the
creation of a new group called the Pennsylvania Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the
Useful Arts in Philadelphia during the time the federal convention was meeting there. WALTERsCHEID,
supra note 45, at 51-52.
9 Seidel, supra note 80, at 10.
" Coulter, supra note 190, at 496.
" Lutz, supra note 87, at 771.
"'Karl B. Lutz, Patents andScience: A Clarificationof the Patent Clause ofthe US. Constitution,32

J. PAT. OFr. Soc'y 83, 86 (1950).
Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, S 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
w Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, S 1, 1 Stat. 318, 319.

"
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interpret the statutory language. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
however, has several times "pointed out that the present day equivalent of
the term 'useful arts' employed by the Founding Fathers is 'technological
arts.' "" In light of more recent judicial determinations concerning the
patentability of new life forms and methods of doing business,2" this is too
narrow a definition of "useful arts."
Let us return for a moment to the interpretation of "invention" and
"discoveries" in the context of the Clause. Obviously, the term "invention"
does not appear therein, but if an inventor is one who invents, then clearly
an inventor is one who makes an invention. It thus is relevant to ascertain
whether there is any distinction between "invention" and "discovery" for
the purposes of determining whether there is a constitutional limitation
(aside from novelty and utility as already discussed) on what constitutes
patentable subject matter.
The Framers never indicated what they meant by the terms "inventors"
and "discoveries" but they appear to have viewed the terms "invention" and
"discovery" as synonymous. In any case, Congress certainly seems to have
assumed them to be synonymous.0 1 As I have indicated, the definition of
discovery at the end of the eighteenth century was exceedingly broad,2. 2 so
that at least in principle the definition of patentable subject matter allowed
by the Constitution was also exceedingly broad. The issue was further
complicated at the end of the eighteenth century by the frequent reference
to the "principles" of an invention, whatever that was intended to mean.
The Constitution does not expressly state what quid pro quo, if any, the
inventor is required to provide in return for the limited-term exclusive right
encompassed by a patent. It was only in the decade immediately preceding
the federal convention that the common law courts had decided that an
inventor was required to provide a patent specification containing an
enabling disclosure, i.e., one teaching those skilled in the art with which the

'" In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952,959,201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 352,359 (1979); In reWaldbaum, 457 F.2d 997,
1003, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 430, 434 (1972) (Rich, J., concurring); and In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893,
167 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280, 289-90 (1970).
m See infa notes 282-90 and accompanying text.
201The Patent Act of 1793 refers to "invention or discovery" S 1, 1 Stat. at 321. See also Act of Apr.
10, 1790 S 1, 1 Stat. at 110 (referring also to "invention or discovery"). See also supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
20 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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the federal convention that the common law courts had decided that an
inventor was required to provide a patent specification containing an
enabling disclosure, i.e., one teaching those skilled in the art with which the
invention was most closely identified to make and use the invention.2 3
Prior to this time, it was not at all clear what the purpose of a patent
specification was, other than to identify the invention in some general sense.
Much of the confusion about the differences, if any, between discovery,
invention, and principles arose out of this fact and was generated by none
other than that most famous of English inventors, James Watt.
Watt's patent on his major improvement in the steam engine was issued
in 1769, but not before he had spent considerable time and effort trying to
decide what should be included in his specification."' He clearly considered
the specification an important matter, but it is unlikely that either he or
those he consulted thought that it would have to be fully enabling in the
manner set forth by Mansfield nine years later in Liardetv. Johnson."5 But
they were not entirely certain on the point. Thus, in February 1769 he
received advice that
you should neither give drawings nor descriptions of
any particular machinery, (if such omission would be
allowed at the office) but specify in the dearest manner that
you can, that you have discovered some principles, and
thought of new applications of others, by means of both
which joined together, you intend to construct steam
engines of much greater powers, and applicable to a much
greater number of useful purposes than any which hitherto
have been constructed, that to effect each particular purpose
you design to employ particular machinery, every species of
which may be ranged in two classes. One class for
...

The
M case most frequently cited as setting forth this requirement is Liardet v. Johnson decided by
Lord Mansfield in 1778. Although the case was not officially reported, knowledge of it survives through
a number of newspaper accounts and pamphlets contemporaneously published. See Edward C.
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law. Antecedents (Part3), 77J. PAT.&
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 771, 793-97 (1995) (discussing Liardet v. Johnson). See also supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
' Robinson states that several drafts of his first specification in his own hand still exist. See Eric
Robinson, James Watt and the Law of Patents, 13 TECH. & CULTUIRE 115, 119 (1972).
' lL See also Walterscheid, supra note 203.
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producing reciprocal motions, and another for producing
motions round axes. As to your principles, we think they
should be enunciated (to use a hard word) as generally as
possible, to secure you as effectually against piracy as the
nature of your invention will allow.2 6

This emphasis on "principles" as opposed to description of specific
embodiments seems peculiar today but it was not in the context of the times.
It has been argued that this advice badly served Watt for two reasons,
because in consequence thereof he failed to provide drawings as a part of the
specification and he sought to patent "a principle ,of action and not an
application of a principle." 7 But in the eighteenth century, seeking to
patent only "an application of a principle" was perceived as fraught with
difficulties by both patentees and those from whom they sought legal advice.
This was in an era when the concept of mandatory specification was
relatively new, and it had never been laid down either by statute or common
law exactly what a specification should do. It would be well into the next
century before the idea of using claims as a means of defining the invention
would be developed. As a patentee wrote in 1784, some six years after
Liardet v. Johnson had been decided and after consulting with Watt and
others viewed as specialists in patents,
they all agreed in saying that there was no need of particular
descriptions and drawings, because the patent was taken
upon the principle which may be applied to numberless
shapes and forms, whereas giving particular description and
drawings would be confining ourselves to these particular

forms and enabling others to use the same principle under
other forms.2
This language rather accurately describes the dilemma patentees perceived
themselves to be in. Provide an insufficient description of the invention and
the courts would invalidate the patent; provide too detailed a description of

Robinson, supra note 204, at 120-21.
lad7at 120 (quoting from H.W. DICKINSON & JAMES WATT,CRAFTMA

AND ENGINEER 52

(Cambridge 1936)).
I8 Id at 121.
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particular embodiments and the courts would construe the invention to be
limited to the particular embodiments described. This in turn would permit
others through minor change or modification to practice the invention
without infringing the patent. It was to avoid what patentees perceived to
be piracy of their inventions through such minor change or modification
that they sought to describe the inventions in terms of general principles
rather than specific embodiments. It would take many years for the
common law to disabuse them of the idea that a patent covered the general
principles under which the invention was perceived to operate."
By special act of Parliament in 1775, the term of Watt's patent was
extended to 1800.210 This extraordinary extension coupled with the
significant commercial success of the new steam engines based on the patent
led almost inevitably to extensive litigation. One of these cases, Boulton v.
Bull,2n decided in 1795, would have an impact on the early development of
both British and American patent law. It is of interest here because of the
views expressed therein by the judges on what constitutes patentable
invention under the Statute of Monopolies.
This was part of the continuing effort by the common law courts to deal
with the issue of the meaning to be given to the phrase "any manner of new
manufactures" in the Statute.212 An initial article of faith, which would
continue to be given a great deal of lip service but which was honored more
in the breach than in reality, was that the Statute was an enactment of
existing common law and should be interpreted as such. A classic example
had to do with the treatment of improvement inventions. Coke had
expounded the common law view, predicated on a holding in Bircot's Case,
that the Statute forbade the granting of a patent for any improvement in an
existing manufacture. 2 " As a practical matter, by early in the eighteenth

' Indeed the idea still seems to have been prevalent as late as 1829, although by that time there seems
to have been a consensus that patents "could not be granted on abstract principles." Robinson, supra note
204, at 123.
21 The Fire Engine Act, 15 George II, c. 61 (1775).
21 2 H. BL.463, 126 Eng. Rep. 651 (Common Pleas 1795).
211 Section 6 of the Statute reads in relevant part "... . any declaration before mentioned [banning
patent and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years
monopolies] shall not extend to any letters
or under, hereafter to be made, ofthe sole working or making in any manner of new manufactures within
" Statute of Monopolies,
this realm, to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures ....
21 James I, c. 3; 7 Statutes at Large 255.
213 See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution ofte UnitedStatesPatentLaw:Antecedents (Part
2), 76J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc't 878 (1994).
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century the law officers had come to realize that many of the inventions for
which patents were sought could be characterized as improvements over or
in existing manufactures, but they chose at least tacitly to ignore this in
recommending that patents be granted for these inventions. It was not
surprising that when infringement actions were attempted at equity (as
opposed to actions at common law which came later), the defense was
frequently that the invention was merely an improvement over existing
technology and hence the patent was invalid. 4 When the matter came
before Lord Mansfield in 1776 in Morris v. Bramson,2 " which seems to have
been one of the first common law cases to address the issue, he accepted the
practical reality and held that improvement inventions were patentable. In
"would go to repeal almost every patent that
his view, to hold otherwise
216
ever was granted."
This was all well and good insofar as it went, but what did the term
"manufacture" as used in the Statute mean? What did it actually encompass?
The definitions given in the various opinions in Boulton v. Bull are
interesting if only partially illuminating. Boulton . 7 and Watt argued that
"manufacture" meant "any thing made or produced by art."2 " This seemed
to suggest that some form of skill or special trade needed to be involved. It
also seemed to imply that nothing discovered by accident could be the
subject of a patent because it would not have been "made or produced by
art." Justice Buller refused to accept any such contention, saying "whether
the manufacture be... produced by accident or by art, is immaterial." 21 9 He
also stated, however, that:
The word manufacture is descriptive either of the practice
of making a thing by art, or of the thing when made. The
invention therefore of any instrument used in the process of
making a thing by art, is a manufacture, and the subject of

214 MacLeod cites several instances of this that occurred before 1750. See CHRISTINE MACLEOD,
INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE ENGLISH PATENT

SYSTEM, 1660-1800 64-68

(Cambridge 1988).
"' 1Carp. P.C. 30,1 Abbott's P.C. 21 (King's Bench 1776). This case is also frequently cited as Morris
v.Branson.
26 1Abbott's P.C. at 22.

217Boulton was Watt's senior partner and owned a two-thirds interest in Watt's patent.
2132 H. BI. at 468, 126 Eng. Rep. at 653.
21, 2 H. BI. at 486; 126 Eng. Rep. at 663.
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Justice Heath was of the view that patentable manufactures fell into two
classes:
The first class includes machinery, the second class substances (such as medicines) formed by chemical or other
processes, where the vendible substance is the thing produced, and that which operates preserves no permanent
form. In the first class, the machine, and in the second the
substance produced, is the subject of the patent.2 2'
Moreover, "[t]hat which is the subject of a patent.., ought to be that which
is vendible, otherwise it cannot be a manufacture."22 2 Finally, Chief Justice
Eyre noted that "[iJt was admitted in the argument at the bar, that the word
'manufacture' in the statute... applied not only to things made, but to the
practice of making, to principles carried into practice in a new manner, to
new results of principles carried into practice." "
Although a modem analyst of the English patent system has stated that
"[a]ccording to the Statute of Monopolies a patent could not be granted for
an abstract or philosophical principle,"2 there was no language in the
Statute that could literally be so interpreted. Moreover, Lord Coke, who
was deemed to be the earliest authority on the Statute and provided the first
detailed analysis of it, 2 ' is totally silent on the point. In the eighteenth
century, patentees and those who gave advice concerning patents were
certainly of the view that the Statute did not preclude the patenting of
general principles of operation! 6
As has been noted, Watt in 1769 was advised to specify that he had
discovered "some principles" and to enunciate them as generally as possible
in his specification. "7 He followed this advice, 28 and as a result found

" 2 H. Bl. at 481-82, 126 Eng. Rep. at 660-61.
- 2 H. Bl. at 492, 126 Eng. Rep. at 666.
-4 HAROLDI.DUTTON,THEPATENTSYTEANDINENTrvEACTITY

URNGTHEINDUSTRIAL

REVOLUTrON 1750-1852 73 (Manchester 1984).
' See Walterscheid, supra note 213, at 876-79.
MacLeod, for example, suggests that as early as 1720 patents were being granted for general
principles of operation. See MACLEOD, supra note 214, at 63-64.
2
See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
m But from time to time, he seems to have had some difficulty in defining what he meant by his
"principles.* In at least certain of his works, his defining principles of how various steam engines operated
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As has been noted, Watt in 1769 was advised to specify that he had
discovered "some principles" and to enunciate them as generally as possible
IL228
Il
this advice, and as a result found
in his specification. 127 He followed
himself confronted with the argument in Boulton v. Bull that his patent was
invalid because it was for a principle rather than particular embodiments
pertaining to his improved steam engine. 229 Nonetheless, he must have felt
reasonably comfortable that his approach would withstand common law
scrutiny because in 1776 Chief Justice Eyre had suggested that a "principle"
could be the subject of a patent.230
Imagine his dismay then when the four judges hearing the case, including
Chief Justice Eyre, unanimously held that an abstract principle could not be
the subject of a patent.231 Fortunately for him two of them were prepared
to accept the view that his specification taught more than merely the
application of a principle of nature. Although there would continue to be
some argument about it for several decades, the common law view at the end
of the eighteenth century was that a principle of nature could not be
patented, because this amounted to patenting knowledge of the physical
universe which should be available for all to use.

a See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
2
But from time to time, he seems to have had some difficulty in defining what he meant by his
"principles." In at least certain of his works, his defining principles of how various steam engines
operated come very close to a description of simple natural forces. See Robinson, supra note 204, at 12223, n.22.
Bull's counsel argued that:
The reason seems obvious why this privilege of a monopoly which isto be granted
by the Crown should not be granted merely for the Principle or for the first idea
which may occur to an ingenious mind because if that is the case he isto reserve to
himself the sole power of every possible improvement which may be made upon that
idea in bringing it forward to perfection in the shape of a complete instrument.
Robinson, supra note 204, at 122.
2
DUTTON, supra note 224, at 73.
231 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, 11 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 429 (London 1932). As quoted by
Holdsworth, Chief Justice Eyre stated that a patent was given "not for a principle, but for a process."
Justice Buller argued that:
The very statement of what a principle is, proves it not to be a ground for a patent.
It is the very fist ground and rule for arts and sciences, or in other words the
elements and rudiments of them. A patent must be for some new production from
those elements, and not for the elements themselves.
Id at n.7. Robinson quotes Chief Justice Eyre as also stating that "[u]ndoubtedly there can be no Patent
for a mere Principle but for a Principle so far embodied and connected with corporeal Substances as to
be in a condition to act... I think there may be a Patent for." Robinson, supra note 204, at 123.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

49

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 9:291

If at the end of the century it had become the common law that "any
manner of new manufactures" as used in the Statute encompassed
improvement inventions but did not cover principles of nature (although
there would remain considerable dispute as to what constituted a principle
of nature), there was mass confusion as to the extent to which this phrase

covered so-called "method" or "process" inventions.

Again Watt's

experience is worthy of note. Despite the fact that his improved steam

engines were obviously an article of manufacture, he chose to obtain his
patent for a "Method of diminishing the consumption of fuel in fireengines."232 He did this because he believed that a patent for a method
provided broader protection than one directed to a steam engine per se. His
approach seems to have been a common one in the eighteenth century, and
numerous patents for "methods" were granted by the crown.233
But could any sort of "method" be construed as "any manner of new
manufactures" as contemplated by the Statute? At the end of the eighteenth
century there was no consensus whatsoever among the common law judges
that such a construction was appropriate. As early as 1776 Chief Justice
Eyre had taken the position that a method could properly be patented,234 but
in 1795 in Boulton v. Bull two of the judges had contended that no patent
could be granted for a method unless a new and vendible substance was
produced.23 This caused Watt thereafter to take a different tack and argue
in 1799 in Hornblower v. Boulton236 that his invention was really an
improvement over earlier steam engines. 3
In Hornblowerv. Boulton Lord Kenyon stated that "having now heard
every thing that can be said on the subject, I have no doubt in saying that
this is a patent for a manufacture, which I understandto be something made by
the hands of man (emphasis supplied)." 3
This clearly was a broader

232 In the eighteenth century the term "fire engine" was used to denote what would today be called

a steam engine.
" Robinson, supra note 204, at 120 and 123. In Boulton v. Bull, Chief Justice Eyre stated his belief
that two-thirds to three-fourths "of all patents granted since the statute passed, are for methods of
operating and of manufacturing, producing no new substances, and employing no new machinery." 2
H. Bl. at 494-95, 126 Eng. Rep. at 667. Both Robinson, id at 132, n.54, and DUTTON, supra note 224, at
73, quote Eyre to the same effect but with somewhat different language.
"' DUTTON, supra note 224, at 73.
23sRobinson, supra note 204, at 132; and DUTTON, supra note 224, at 74.
"' 8 T.R. 95, 101 Eng. Rep. 1285 (King's Bench 1799).
"7 DUTrON, supra note 224, at 74.
8'
S T.R. at 99, 101 Eng. Rep. at 1288.
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definition of "manufacture" than even Watt had argued for four years earlier
in Boulton v. Bull. It did not require "art" to be involved and thus was at
least suggestive of the view that patentable invention could occur by
accident. Nor did it require that an invention be "vendible" in order to be
considered a manufacture. It implicitly seemed to indicate that products of
nature were not patentable since not "made by the hands of man."
Lord Kenyon's definition of "manufacture" did not specifically address
the issue of whether "methods" fell within the ambit of "manufactures" as
used in the Statute of Monopolies. Rather, he was of the view that Watt was
actually claiming "a monopoly for an engine or machine, composed of
material parts, which are to produce the effect described,"" 9 despite the fact
that the patent was clearly titled to be for a method. In essence, he argued
that a patent ostensibly for a method was really a patent for the substance
produced by the method or for the apparatus which produced the effect
intended by the method of operation.
Nonetheless, to the extent the judges were prepared to accept that certain
methods involving new and vendible substances or apparatus were
patentable, this did not mean that there was consensus that any and all
methods were patentable. Indeed, as noted above, two of the judges in
Boulton v. Bull were clearly of the view that there could be no patent for a
new process of producing an old product. As one of the earliest texts on the
patent law stated in 1806: "most of the patents now taken out, are by name,
for the method of doing particular things: and where the patent is for only
a method, if it be not affected or accompanied by a manufacture, it seems the
By this was apparently meant "affected or
patent is not good." 2"
accompanied by a manufacture [which was novel andpatentable in its own
right]." This inability to clearly distinguish between method or process and
apparatus or product would present grave difficulties for the English patent
law in the years to come." 1 Those same difficulties would also appear in the
early U.S. patent law.
Watt was perhaps as expert as anybody on the state of the patent law in
England as the eighteenth century came to a close, but when it came to what
239

I

2'0 DUTrON, supra note 224, at 74 (quotingW.LiiAM HANDS, THE LAW AND PRAcTICE OF PATENTS

FOR INVENTIONS 6 (1806)).
241 It was not until 1842 that it was finally settled that "manufacture" as used in the Statute of
Monopolies includes 'processes" within its ambit. See Crane v. Price, 1Web. P.C. 393, 134 Eng. Rep. 239
(1842).
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constituted patentable invention he was as uncertain as any other inventor
or lawyer of the time. Sometime about 1795 he summed up his "Doubts and
Queries upon Patents" as follows:
[1] Whether the King can grant a patent for a method of
doing or performing any mechanical process
[2] Whether in such case patent would be valid without a
description of an organized machine
[3] Whether a man improving his invention after patent
granted, does not invalidate his patent
[4] Whether a patentee refusing to add his improvement to
an old machine does not render patent void
[5] Whether a patentee asking more than a fair provid [sic]
does not invalidate
[6] Whether a patent for an improvement on an old
invention is valid
[7] Whether patent for new mode of using old instruments
is valid
[8] Whether a patent for a chemical process is valid242
Although it has been argued that none of these questions had been
satisfactorily answered by the common law in 1795,243 the answer to query
[6] was reasonably clear. The others, however, were still very much up in
the air. The infant United States found these and many other questions
unanswered when it turned to the common law to interpret its own brand
new patent law.
At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century
there was a marked tendency for American inventors, just as English
inventors, to speak of the "principles" of their invention. The reasoning was
the same as in England, namely, a desire to avoid being literally limited to
particular embodiments described in the specification. Thus, for example,
in 1792 Joseph Barnes suggested that any new patent law should provide that
"a person shall be entitled to obtain a patent, provided he shall have
discovered a new principle in case of machines, or shall have discovered an
improvement in the principle of any machine which is free or

242
243

Robinson, supra note 204, at 131.
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patented .... . 2"4 This language was at least partially incorporated into the
Patent Act of 1793.24
The earliest American patent case to discuss a meaning to be attributed
to "principle" was Whitney v. Carter decided in 1810. Eli Whitney had
sued Carter for infringement of his cotton ginning patent. In defense,
Carter alleged that Whitney's gin was not novel, in that an earlier machine
was the same "in principle" as Whitney's gin. In response, Whitney's
counsel made two distinct arguments. The first was that even if the
"principle" of the two machines was the same, Whitney had applied it in an
entirely new fashion and for a distinct purpose that was patentable.
Secondly, he contended that the "principle" of the two machines was
entirely different." 7
Of particular interest to the present discussion is that:
He defined the term "principle," as applied to the mechanic
arts, to mean the elements and rudiments of those arts, or,
in other words, the first grounds and rule for them. That
for a mere principle a patent cannot be obtained. That
neither the element, nor the manner of combining them,
nor even the effect produced can be the subject of a patent;
and that it can only be obtained for the application of this
effect to some new and useful purpose. 48
The court agreed "that the legal title to a patent consists, not in a principle
merely, but in an application of a principle, whether previously in existence
or not, to some new and useful purpose."249
In 1813 Justice Story in his capacity as circuit judge amplified the point
when he declared:

244

BARNES, supra note 30, at 30-31.

24 Section 2 of the Act provided:

that any person who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of any
machine... which shall have been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for
such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use, or vend the original
discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the improvement.

24 29 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C.D. Ga. 1810).
247

29 F. Cas. at 1071.

248

I

2'4 29

F. Cas. at 1072-73.
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So if the principles of the machine are new, either to
produce a new or an old effect, the inventor may well
entitle himself to the exclusive right of the whole machine.
By the principles of a machine, (as these words are used in
the statute) is not meant the original elementary principles
of motion, which philosophers and science have discovered,
but the modus operandi, the peculiar device or manner of
producing any given effect.2"
Five years later, he would state, "The true legal meaning of the principle of
a machine, with reference to the patent act, is the peculiar structure or
constituent parts of such machine."2"'
In essence, the courts sought to distinguish between physical or scientific
principles in the abstract and the applications of such principles to produce
a useful result. Taken in the abstract, scientific or physical principles were
held not to be patentable. But because they viewed the application of such
principles to produce useful technological results as a promotion of the
progress of the useful arts (although they almost never phrased it in this
fashion), they held that such application could indeed be patentable, but this
generally required some change or improvement in the means used to effect
the application." 2
Nonetheless, even in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court found itself addressing general problems of the patentability of
"principles":
The wordprincipleis used by elementary writers on patent
subjects, and sometimes in adjudications of courts, with such
a want of precision in its application, as to mislead. It is
admitted that a principle is not patentable. A principle, in
the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; and these cannot be patented, as no one can claim
in either of them an exclusive right. Nor can an exclusive

2

Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Gas. 1123, 1124 (C.CD. Mass. 1813).

2s Barrett v. Hall, 2 F. Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. Mass. 1818).
m For an interesting early discussion of these issues, see WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS
FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE REMEDIES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT

RIGHTS 95-108 (1837).
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right exist to a new power, should one be discovered in
addition to those already known. * * * A new property
discovered in matter, when practically applied, in the
construction of a useful article of commerce or manufacture,
is patentable; but the process through which the new
property is developed and applied, must be stated, with such
precision as to enable an ordinary mechanic to construct
and apply the necessary process.2"'

Oliver Evans was the first in the United States to make a serious attempt
to define what constituted patentable subject matter. In 1813 he posed the
question: "What is the original discovery in a new and useful improvement
in any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter?" and answered:
It is the new and useful effect or result produced by the
characteristic principles of the machine and may consist of:
1. The discovery of the application of a new principle by
means of old and known machines, to produce a new and
useful result.2" In this case the application of the principle
and result will be secured.
2. The discovery of a new machine to produce a known
effect or result, with less labour or expense. In this case the
patent will be for the machine.
3. The discovery of a new combination of known machines
to produce a new and useful result."' s In this case, the
combination will be secured by patent, as well as the new
result.
4. The application of known principles to produce a new
and useful result. In this case the result will be secured.
5. The discovery of the application of a known machine, to
a new use.2" Here the new application will be secured, if it

Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852).
' ThomasJefferson parted company with Evans on this point and absolutely refused to acknowledge
that a new use of an old machine was patentable. For Jefferson's views on the patent law in the first two
2.

decades of the nineteenth century, see Edward C. Walterscheid, Patentsand the JeffersonianMythology, 29
JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 298-311 (1995).
"s Here too, Jefferson initially disagreed, but after more thought changed his mind. Id
21 Jefferson strongly disagreed. Id
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be useful, by producing the effect with less labour or
expense.
6. The discovery of an improvement on a known machine,
to fit it for applying to a new use, to produce a useful result.
Here the improvement and new application will be secured.
7. The discovery of a new and useful improvement in the
process of any art or manufacture, although on experiment
no means may yet be known, by which the improvement
may be carried into effect with profit by the manufacturer.
Here the improvement in the process will be secured,
although the use can hardly be ascertained.
8. The discovery of a new machine that was necessary to
carry a new process into effect that has been discovered by
another. Here the machine is the discovery, and will be
secured for all purposes for which it will apply.
9. The discovery of a new and improved process in any art
or manufacture, and also a set of machines, some improved,
others altogether new, and their combination, to carry the
improved process into effect to produce a new and useful
result. In this case, the new improved process, and the new
result in the discovery, will be secured; also the improved
and new machines are discoveries, and will be secured for all
the uses to which they apply.
10. The discovery of the application of a known power or
principle to a new and useful purpose, as the extension of
the application to move a known machine with greater
force, by the discovery of a new and improved form of the
machine, rendering it susceptible of the new or extended
application, so as to produce a greater effect, or a new or
more useful result, or at a less expense. In this case the
original discovery consists in the new or extended
application, and in the change of or improved form of the
machine, both will be secured either jointly or separately.
11. The discovery of an unknown principle, applicable to
useful purposes without discovering the means of profitable
application. Here the principle discovered will be secured
by our laws, differing from British.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol9/iss2/3

56

Walterscheid: "Within the Limits of the Constitutional Grant": Constitutional L
2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
12. The discovery of the means of profitably applying a
useful principle, discovered by another, to a useful purpose.
Here the means of application will be secured, subject-to the
prior right of the discoverer of the principle.
13. The discovery of an improvement in the mode or means
of the application of a principle. Here the improvement
will be secured, subject to the prior right of the discoverer
of the principle, also to the first discoverer of the means of
application; for no prior right shall be dischargedor lessened
by a subsequent grant of protection.
14. The discovery of an unknown plant and its uses. Here
the plant will be secured, and all the uses that are specified
by the patentee.
15. The discovery of new uses of a known plant. Here the
new uses will be secured, subject to the prior right of the
discoverer of the plant, during the patent term." 7

Evans was well ahead of his time with regard to certain of these items, for
example, plant patents, and others that would never be judicially interpreted
to constitute patentable subject matter, for example, the discovery of a new
scientific principle. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Evans had given more
serious thought to what might constitute patentable subject matter than had
anyone else in the country. But he still had some difficulty in coming to
grips with the idea that methods should be patentable, although he was
certainly amenable to it.
Although the Supreme Court has stated that "a process has historically
enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of 'art' as that
term was used in [the Patent Act of 1793], " "28it was not at all clear in 1793
that the phrase "useful art[s]" as it appeared in the Patent Clause or the 1793
Act encompassed processes within the ambit of patentable invention. While
the 1793 Act made reference to "the process of any composition of
matter," 2 9 no one knew for certain what that was intended to mean.
15 OLIVEREvANS, (Patrick N. Elisha, Poet Laureate, pseud.) PATENTRIGHT OPPRESSION EXPOSED;
OR, KNAVERY DETECTED 137-39 (Philadelphia 1813) (writing in an address to unite all good people to

obtain a repeal of the Patent Laws. Much of this work was intended as a satire on those opposed to the
patent laws, but he incorporated his views on what the patent law should be in it.).
2' Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (1981).
' Patent Act of 1793 S 2.
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Jefferson, for one, could never conceive of a process or method of doing
something as being patentable."6 Boulton v. Bull, decided in 1795, set the
common law view that certain processes or methods were patentable, but
the issue was not early addressed in the American judicial determinations.
It was not until 1854 that the Supreme Court declared that "A process,
eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in our act of Congress [but
rather] is included [in] the general term 'useful art.' " In a confusing vein,
the Court went on to state that "[a] new process is usually the result; a
machine, of invention," thereby inferring some distinction between the
terms "discovery" and "invention" in the patent law. Be that as it may, it
concluded that: "It is for the discovery or invention of some practical
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect that a patent is
granted, and not for the result or effect itself. It is when the term process is
used to represent the means or method of producing a result that it is
patentable, and it will include all methods or means which are not effected
by mechanism or mechanical combinations." 6 Ever since, it has been clear
that processes and methods for producing a useful result, if novel and
unobvious, are patentable subject matter. In 1952, Congress finally got
around to declaring processes to be statutorily patentable subject matter.262
The Supreme Court has repeatedly reiterated that laws of nature, natural
263
phenomena, or abstract ideas do not constitute patentable subjects,
without stating what constitutional objection, if any, exists to treating them

'" For Jefferson's varying and sometimes inconsistent views on the patent law, see Walterscheid,
supra note 254.
261 Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1854).
2- See 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1994).
26 See, eg., Die/r, 450 U.S. at 185 ("Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural

phenomena, and abstract ideas."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 175 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1972)
("Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 280 (1948) ('[P]atents cannot issue for the discovery of
the phenomena of nature... They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has not claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes."); MacKay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S.
86, 94, 40 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 199 (1939) ("While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is
not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth
may be."); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874) ("An idea of itself is not
patentable ... ."); O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 116 (1853) ('[Tjhe discovery of a principle
in natural philosophy or physical science, is not patentable."); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156,
175 (1852) ("A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot
be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.").
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as patentable "discoveries" within the meaning of the Patent Clause. Kreiss
argues that the Court predicated these holdings on its interpretation of the
term "discoveries" as used in the Clause. From this he concludes that
"discoveries" is a term of art and that "since 'discoveries' and 'useful arts' are
integrally related concepts, one must infer that 'useful arts' is also a term of
art."2 "
He acknowledges, however, that as he puts it "it is hard to know whether
the Court correctly interpreted the word 'discoveries' in the Constitution,
either on linguistic or on policy grounds." 26' This assumes, incorrectly I
believe, that either the definition of "discoveries" or policy grounds forms
the basis for these holdings by the Court. Since the Court has never
indicated the constitutional basis for the holdings, and it is in fact rather
clear that they are not predicated on either linguistic interpretation of the
term "discoveries" or on policy considerations, 266 it is reasonable to look
elsewhere in the Patent Clause to ascertain the basis for these holdings.
Simply put, a rationale for these holdings resides in the interpretation of the
terms "useful arts" in the Clause. 26 As Kreiss puts it, "the subject matter of
patents is limited to the 'discoveries' which must be in the 'useful arts.' "268
If to be patentable a discovery must promote the progress of the useful
arts, then the phrase "to promote the progress of. .. useful arts" in the
Clause serves as a limitation on any broad interpretation of "discoveries" as
used therein to include natural phenomena, laws of nature, or abstract
ideas.269 In other words, natural phenomena, laws of nature, or abstract
ideas, without more, are not considered to be "useful arts." However, if

26

Kreiss, supra note 184, at 67.

265 J,

' Kreiss admits that when the Constitution was drafted the meaning of "discover" included the
finding of natural phenomena. lId Moreover, in our system of government, it isnot the usual role of the
judiciary, including the Supreme Court, to set policy, and there isnothing to suggest that in making these
holdings the Court viewed itself as in any way setting policy as opposed to interpreting the law.
6 Indeed the Court has expressly stated that 'it is only useful arts-arts which may be used to
advantage-that can be made the subject of a patent." Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone
Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888).
26 Kreiss, supra note 184, at 63.
26 Without referring to the Clause,

the Supreme Court has stated:
discovered
in
the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
new
mineral
[A]
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that
e; 2 nor could Newton have patented his law of gravity. Such discoveries are
E - mC
manifestations of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309,206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
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they are employed in such a fashion as to produce a useful technological
result, then patentable "discovery" resides in the embodiment or process that
makes use of them to produce the useful result, and not in them apart from
such embodiment or process.
One problem with interpreting the words "useful arts" as they appear in
the Patent Clause, and hence what falls within the ambit of patentable
"discovery" is that, despite what courts and commentators have said,270
"useful arts" as the phrase appears in the Clause encompasses more than
merely the technological arts. Moreover, the interpretation as to what is
covered by "useful arts" of necessity changes with time. Nowhere is this
more apparent than in the changing judicial view on the patentability of
natural products and so-called business methods.
As early as 1813, Oliver Evans argued that the discovery of an unknown
plant and its uses could be patented.27 ' The extent to which life forms and
their products were sought to be patented in the nineteenth century is
unclear.2n However, in 1889 in refusing to authorize a patent for the natural
fibers of a particular tree, the Commissioner of Patents declared: "I am not
aware of any instance in which it has been held that a natural product is the
subject of a patent, although it may have existed from creation without
being discovered." 27 1 In 1980 in reviewing why plant patents had been
refused prior to 1930 the Supreme Court indicated that this decision "came
to 'se[t) forth the general stand taken in these matters' that plants were
natural products not subject to patent protection. "274

o See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979) ("[The present day equivalent of the term

'useful arts' employed by the Founding Fathers is 'technological arts.. .' "); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d
997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972) ("1W'ether appellant's process is a 'statutory' invention depends on whether
it is within the 'technological am .... ' "); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) ("All that
isnecessary... to make asequence of operational steps a statutory 'process' within 35 U.S.C. 5 101 isthat
it be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the
progress of 'useful arts.'"); 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHIStJM ON PATENTS G1-23 (1998) (identifying
"technological arts- as being synonymous with "useful arts); and Vincent Chiapetta, Patentabilityof
Computer Softuware Instruction as an 'Article of Manufacture":Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J.
MARSHALLJ. CoMPuTER&INFo. L. 89,129-30(1998) (stating that the 'useful arts' involve "technology"

or "industrial arts).
v' See supranote 257 and accompanying text.
2

But such patents were occasionally issued. Thus, for example, in 1873 Louis Pasteur received a

United States patent which included a claim for: "Yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article
of manufacture." ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT LAW AND PoLICY 177 (2d ed. 1997) (citing to
Louis Pasteur'sPatents, ScIENCE, Oct. 8, 1937).
27 Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123, 127 (1889). But see supra note 272.
v' Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980) (citing to Thorne,
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The reason the Court limited its discussion to the period before 1930 was
that in that year Congress enacted the Plant Protection Act which afforded
patent protection to certain asexually reproduced plants.7 In so doing,
Congress argued "that the work of the plant breeder 'in aid of nature' was
patentable invention."" 6 Although neither the Supreme Court nor the
Congress addressed the patent protection afforded by the Plant Protection
Act, and later by the Plant Variety Protection Act,2"' in the context of any
interpretation of the Patent Clause, it is reasonable to suggest that prior to
1930 the creation or discovery of new plant varieties was not deemed to
promote the progress of useful arts, whereas from 1930 on it has been
viewed as doing so. In this mode of looking at things, the interpretation of
what constitutes a useful art in the Clause had changed.
But in 1948 in Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,2" 8 the
Supreme Court took the position that a novel and unobvious2" combination
of naturally occurring strains of bacteria useful for fixing nitrogen in
leguminous plants was unpatentable. The prior art had taught that different
strains of bacteria useful for fixing nitrogen in particular leguminous plants
could not be combined in one inoculant suitable for a variety of leguminous
plants because the various strains were mutually inhibitive on each other.
The inventor had discovered that there were in fact strains of the bacteria
that were not mutually inhibitive and hence could be combined in a single
inoculant for several legumes. The combination of strains with this highly
valuable property was not found in nature.
Nonetheless, according to the Court,
the qualities of the bacteria . . . are the work of nature.
Those qualities are of course not patentable. For patents
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature.
The qualities of these bacteria; like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the

Relation of PatentLaw to NaturalProducts, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'f 23, 24 (1923)).
See 35 U.S.C. S 161. In the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 Congress extended patent
protection to novel varieties of sexually reproduced plants. See 7 U.S.C. S 2402(a).
26 447 U.S. at 312 (citing to S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) at 6-8) and H.R. Rep. No.

1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) at 7-9.
2" See supra note 275.
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
At least from the teaching of the prior art.
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storehouse of knowledge of all men.
They are
manifestations of the laws of nature, free to all men and
reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers a hitherto
unknown phenomenon of nature has no claim to a
monopoly of it which the law recognizes. * * * [T]here is no
invention here unless the discovery that certain strains of
the several species of these bacteria are non-inhibitive and
may thus be safely mixed is invention. But we cannot so
hold without allowing a patent to issue on one of the
ancient secrets of nature now disclosed.280
The difficulty with this approach is spelled out by the Court in a 1981
decision when it declared that such an analysis "would, if carried to its
extreme, make all inventions unpatentable because all inventions can be
reduced to underlying principles of nature which, once known, make their
28
implementation obvious." '
Be that as it may, in 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabartythe Court once
again expressly stated that "a new plant found in the wild is not patentable
subject matter" regardless of what useful properties it might have.282 It did,
however, note that in enacting the Patent Act of 1952 Congress intended
"statutory subject matter" to "include anything under the sun that is made
by man."283 According to the Court, "Congress . . .recognized that the
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but
between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made
inventions."2 " This seemed to suggest that, in the Court's view, there is a
distinction between "discovery" and "invention" with patentable invention
being limited to something "made by man." Since such a distinction is not

333 U.S. at 130, 132.
2

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 9 n.12 (1981). Although the

quoted language was in the context of an argument that a mathematical algorithm must be assumed to
be within the prior art, it would seem to be applicable to the Court's statement in Funk Bros. that to
permit the patenting of the combination of bacterial strains set forth therein would be to permit the
patenting of 'one of the ancient secrets of nature.* Interestingly, the Court in Diebr cited to Funk Bros.
for the proposition that: "Itis now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a well known structure or process may be deserving of patent protection." 450 U.S. at 187-88.
2 See supra note 269.
223 447 U.S. at 309 (citing to S.Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) at 5,and H.R. Rep. No.
1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) at 6).
n4 447 U.S. at 313.
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found in the Patent Act of 1952,25 its origin must arguably reside in the
constitutional language, but as I have earlier suggested, there was not a clear
distinction between "invention" and "discovery" at the time the
Constitution was drafted." 6 Nonetheless, since Chakrabartyit has been
commonly assumed that a new life form created by man is patentable
whereas a new life form merely discovered is not.
The judicially created doctrine that business methods are not patentable
seems to have originated in dictum in a 1908 Second Circuit opinion,
namely: "A system of transacting business disconnected from the means for
carrying out the system is not, within the most liberal interpretation of the
term, an art."
Here the court was referring to "art" as it appeared in the
patent statute rather than as it appeared in the Patent Clause. Nonetheless,
this view generally held sway until 1998 when the Federal Circuit gave short
shrift to it in State StreetBank & Trust Co. v. SignatureFinancialGroup,Inc.28
Instead the Federal Circuit gave its whole-hearted approval to the following
guidelines set forth by the Patent Office in 1996:
Office personnel have had difficulty in properly treating
claims directed to methods of doing business. Claims should
not be categorized as methods of doing business. Instead
such claims should be treated like any other process
claims." 9
The court also stressed that "[t]he question of whether a claim encompasses
statutory subject matter should not focus on which of the four categories of
subject matter a claim is directed to-process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter-but rather on the essential characteristics of the
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility."2" Phrased somewhat
differently, whether a discovery covers patentable subject matter depends on
whether it promotes the progress of useful arts, i.e., its practical utility.

21 The Patent Act of 1952 declares that "invention" means "invention or discovery." See supra note
26 and accompanying text.
26 See supra Part M.c.
a7 Hotel Sec. Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908).
m 149 F.3d 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
149 F.3d at 1377 (citing U.S. Patent and Trademark 1996 Examination Guidelines for Computer
Related Inventions).
.. 149 F.3d at 1375.
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Kreiss, for one, is not happy with this state of affairs and believes that
business methods should not be patentable. He strives hard to find some
constitutional basis for refusing patentability to such methods, but finds
none. Instead, he argues that such methods should not be patentable because
"the repeated comments made by courts, commentators, and the PTO over
the years to the effect that business methods are not patentable subject
matter should be taken as strong evidence that business systems are perceived
to be far outside the bounds of the "useful arts.' "291 This view, however,
seems to be far contrary to his own earlier contention that patentable
"discoveries" in the "useful arts" should be generally limited to things that
are "functional." He states that a work is "functional... if it performs some
utilitarian task other than to inform, entertain, or portray an appearance to
human beings."292 Clearly, business methods are functional within this
interpretation and hence should be patentable, provided they are novel and
unobvious.
V. CONCLUSIONS

The Patent Clause authorizes Congress to create a limited-term exclusive
right in an inventor, not for the purpose of securing any existing right to the
invention,293 but rather "to promote the progress of ... useful arts" by
ultimately placing the invention in the public domain. In turn, the
invention can only be placed in the public domain if there is a teaching given
to the public of how to make and use the invention. That is the
consideration required by the introductory language of the Patent Clause in
return for the limited-term exclusive property right in the invention
encompassed in the patent grant.
The Clause also requires that the exclusive right be given only to
inventors for their discoveries. This in turn obligates or requires Congress
to issue patents only in the name of the inventor or inventors even though
all of the patentee's rights may have been assigned to someone else. Indeed,
both Congress and the courts have always recognized this constitutional
29

Kreiss, supr note 184, at 85-86. In so stating, he conveniently ignores the point made in State

Street that the courts primarily responsible for hearing patent issues, namely, the Court of Custom and

Patent Appeals and its successor, the Federal Circuit, have never held an invention to be unpatentable on
the ground that it isdirected to a method of doing business. See 149 F.3d at 1375.
29

Kreiss, supra note 184, at 79.

293 Wheaton

v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 591, 661-62 (1834).
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requirement, and any attempt by Congress by legal fiction to define an
assignee of a patent right as an inventor would be constitutionally suspect at
best.2 "
Without realizing it, the Framers created a significant interpretational
problem when they chose to use the term "discoveries" in the Clause. While
they quite likely viewed "discovery" as synonymous with "invention," its
eighteenth century definition was sufficiently broad to read on the finding
out of something which previously existed but had yet to be revealed. While
invention could arguably be interpreted as limited to the creation of
something new, discovery encompassed more than simply a creative act.
Clearly, the searching for and finding out of the laws of nature and the
phenomena of nature such as previously unknown life forms or minerals
constituted discovery, although nothing new was in fact created. Thus the
use of the term "discoveries" in the Patent Clause gave Congress very broad
discretion as to what it might deem to be patentable discovery.29
In order to be patentable, the constitutional language clearly required that
a discovery be new, or novel in the jargon that would develop, but new in
what sense? Today, in an era of rapid world-wide communication, such a
question would be treated as largely academic, but it was one of real import
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Patent Clause was
incorporated in the Constitution to assure that Congress would have
authority to engage in something akin to the British patent practice as it
existed near the end of the eighteenth century.2
A primary reason for seeking to adopt and adapt the British patent
custom was that it was perceived to be an important factor in the rapid
industrialization of Great Britain that had recently commenced. Authority
for the British patent practice was the Statute of Monopolies which
exempted patents for new manufactures from the ban on monopolies. Bear
in mind that the early English patent custom arose out of a desire to create
29 The fact that Congress has for almost a century defined the proprietor of a work made for hire
as an "author" in the copyright context is evidence only of a massive inconsistency in the statutory
treatment of the exclusive rights known as patents and copyrights. It is remarkable that the issue of the
constitutionality of the congressional practice with regard to copyright has never reached the Supreme
Court.
' In 1974 the Supreme Court quoted with approval the view that: "Quite clearly discovery is
something less than invention.* See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 538
(6th Cir. 1934), quoted in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673
(1974).

m WALTERSCHEID, supra note 45, at 32-39.
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new industries in the realm primarily by importation and only secondarily
by what would now be termed invention. Thus, the phrase "true and first
inventor" in the Statute of Monopolies had been interpreted under the
common law to include not only the first inventor but the first importer as
well. At the time of the drafting of the Constitution, novelty was defined
in Great Britain by whether the subject matter of the invention was known
or used within the country, and it was immaterial whether it was known or
used elsewhere. It was the introduction of the invention in Great Britain
that defined novelty and not originality per se. 297
There is nothing whatever to indicate or suggest that in drafting the
Patent Clause the Framers intended it to encompass a narrower view of
patentable novelty than that which existed in Great Britain. Yet the first
Congress assumed this to be the case and refused to authorize patents of
importation on the grounds that such were constitutionally precluded.
Moreover, it would include language in the Patent Act of 1793, which the
Supreme Court interpreted in 1818 as requiring an invention to be not only
new but original throughout the world in order to be patentable in the
United States."' But in so doing, the Court would expressly decline to
interpret the meaning to be given to the terms "invention" or "discovery"
in either the patent statute or the Patent Clause.
In light of this narrow view of novelty, it might be assumed that any
publication or use of the invention or discovery that placed it in the public
domain would automatically preclude patentability, but this was not the case
in at least one context through the nineteenth century. Thus on a number
of occasions Congress authorized and the courts upheld patent term
extensions or renewals that occurred after the original patent had expired
and the subject matter had gone into the public domain.2 The rationale
given by Congress for so doing was that such was necessary to assure an
adequate reward to the inventor. Never mind that the Clause spoke only of
promoting the progress of useful arts and that it was difficult to see how
extending or renewing a patent after it had expired served in any way to
promote such progress. More recently, however, the Supreme Court has
concluded that the Clause precludes Congress from issuing patents that

29
'

These points are discussed in more detail in

WALTERSCHEID, supra note 42, at 48-56.

See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra note 42, at 285-88.
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ment of novelty would seem to require such a conclusion, even though an
original inventor may be involved.
Although the contemporaneous interpretation given to the terms
"inventors" and "discoveries" clearly indicated a constitutional requirement
of novelty before a patent could issue, the statement of purpose in the Clause
can also be construed as placing constitutional limitations on the power of
Congress to issue patents.3"' That it also suggests a constitutional requirement of novelty and utility in order for patentability to exist can also be
inferred from its language. But in 1966 in Graham v. John Deere Co. the
Supreme Court declared that the introductory language of the Clause sets
forth a constitutional standard of invention. 2 as an additional condition for
patentability. In the Court's view, something more than novelty is
constitutionally required for patentability, but, what that something is
remains unclear. Most commentators have assumed that this constitutional
standard refers to the unobviousness requirement first set forth by the Court
in 1851 in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood and made statutory in 1952.303 While
Congress has wide discretion to set standards of patentability and has indeed
set unobviousness as a standard, it is questionable at best whether such a
standard is required by the Patent Clause. In this regard, it is of interest to
note that the Hotchkiss Court made no attempt to use the language of the
Clause to justify its conclusion that patentability required the application of
a higher standard of skill than that possessed by, "an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business. " 4
The Court's rationale for holding that a constitutional standard of
invention exists was not predicated in any way on a specific analysis of the
actual language of the Clause nor on any contemporaneous interpretation of
Clause language by the Framers, but instead was based almost entirely on an
erroneous and misleading interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's role in the
early development of the patent law and his views on it. The difficulty with
this approach is that aside from being a misrepresentation of Jefferson's role
and views, it ignores the fact that Jefferson never expressed any views on

-a See WALTEISCHEID, supra note 42, at Ch. 5. I also suggested there that it places a limitation on
the duration of patent and copyright terms that can be set by Congress. IdL at 273-79.
' See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
"3 See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
' Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
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interpretation of the Patent Clause after his early exchange of correspondence with James Madison in 1788 and 1789.3"5
Contrary to the Court's assertion, Jefferson most definitely did not
believe that the courts should develop conditions for patentability over and
above those set forth by statute,30" but even if he had such a belief, it is not
relevant to constitutional interpretation of the language of the Clause. The
Court's assertion that Congress agreed by negative implication with the view
that courts are authorized to set standards of patentability because it failed
to set a higher standard of patentability between 1790 and 1950 than merely
utility and novelty"0 7 is wholly without merit. Nothing in the Clause grants
such authority to courts, and it is just as likely that the failure of Congress
to set a higher statutory standard of patentability was predicated on the view
that none was required by the constitutional language or needed as a practical
matter. Indeed, if the Hotcbkisstest is predicated on a constitutional standard
(which is nowhere evident),"'8 and Congress understood it as such, it is
difficult to understand why it took a century for such an unobviousness
standard to be incorporated into the patent statute.
The answer, of course, is that in the intervening period between Hotchkiss
and the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, no court held that the Hotchkiss
test was constitutionally required, and Congress-as evidenced by its
inaction-most certainly did not perceive it to be constitutionally required
for patentability. In this regard, the legislative history of the 1952 Act
declares that section 103 thereof, setting forth an unobviousness requirement
for patentability "for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which
exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason
ofdecisions of the courts (emphasis supplied)." 3" If there is a clear constitutional mandate that sets a higher standard of patentability than merely utility
and novelty, then it is indeed the duty of the Court to so determine, but the
Court is without authority to substitute its judgment for that of Congress
absent a clear constitutional mandate. No such clear mandate exists in the
Patent Clause.310

m See supra note 161.
3Id
See supra notes 152 and 153 and accompanying text.
s See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
3 See S. Rep. No. 82-1979 at 2399 (1952).
0 It should be noted that the Clause is part of article I, section 8 of the Constitution, which sets forth
the enumerated powers of Congress and does not delineate any power of the federal courts.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

While Jefferson undoubtedly had high standards for patentability as the
Court declared, his standards were not those of the Framers or the first and
second federal Congresses. Thus, in enacting the Patent Act of 1793, the
second Congress which contained a number of Framers expressly declined
to incorporate his proposal set forth in a draft patent bill in 1791 for a
statutory nonobviousness standard."' If there is indeed a constitutional
standard of invention set forth in the Patent Clause, it is difficult to
understand why the first patent acts did not incorporate such a standard.312
If the Court's holding that a constitutional standard of invention is
required by the Clause is based on a false reading of the historical record, the
same is not true of its understanding that novelty and utility are
constitutional requirements. The need for novelty is found both in the
contemporary definitions of "inventors" and "discoveries" and in the
requirement that patents promote the progress of useful arts. Clearly, if a
discovery is not new, it does not promote such progress. A requirement for
utility is not found in contemporaneous definitions of "inventors" and
"discoveries" but can be found in the introductory language of the Clause,
for, if a discovery is not utilitarian, it does not promote the progress of
useful arts. Contrary to the assertion of the Supreme Court in Brennerv.
Manson,"' there is no constitutional requirement that an invention must
have "substantial utility" in order to be patentable.
Care should be taken to clearly distinguish between standards for
patentability and patentable subject matter because they are not the same
thing at all. While there are clearly constitutional requirements that must
be met in setting standards of patentability, it is less clear that there are
constitutional limits on what constitutes patentable subject matter. I have
suggested, however, that to the extent such limitations exist they must be
found in the introductory language of the Clause and, in particular, in the
definition accorded to "useful arts" as found in the Clause.

the enumerated powers of Congress and does not delineate any power of the federal courts.
.. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.

" In this regard, in 1884 the Supreme Court declared in the copyright context that the interpretation
placed on the Constitution by the first copyright acts of 1790 and 1802 *by the men who were
contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the convention which framed it, is
of itself entitled to very great weight." Burrow-Giles Lithography Co. v. Sarony, 111 US. 53, 57 (1884).
' 383 U.S. 519, 534, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689 (1966). The Court did not define what it meant by
'substantial utility" and there isno basis in the constitutional language for the use of such phraseology.
It implies that while certain inventions may indeed promote the progress of useful arts, there are
nonetheless constitutionally unworthy of a patent because their utility is not sufficiently great.
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The Supreme Court has never sought to provide a definition of "useful
arts" as that phrase appears in the Clause, although it has expressly stated
that "it is only useful arts... that can be made the subject of a patent."31
Nonetheless, I have suggested herein that the Court, without any express
reference to the constitutional language, has effectively limited "useful arts"
to exclude natural phenomena, laws of nature, or abstract ideas, which,
without more, have repeatedly been held not to be patentable subject
matter. It is in this context that I have suggested that "discoveries" as used
in the Clause is limited to discoveries in the useful arts. Lower courts and
commentators have on a number of occasions suggested that "useful arts"
means "technological arts." But even this is not particularly helpful because
patents are routinely granted in fields that do not appear to fall within the
definition of technological arts.31
In 1980 in Diamond v. Chakrabarty the Supreme Court noted with
approval that the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 indicated that
statutory patentable subject matter was intended "to include anything under
the sun that is made by man."316 Although no reference was made to "useful
arts" as that phrase appears in the Patent Clause, I believe that phrase should
be interpreted as including anything made or created by the hand of man
and as excluding anything not made or created by man. This would be fully
in accord with the long held view that natural phenomena, laws of nature,
and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter. In this approach,
"discoveries" as used in the Clause is limited to those discoveries falling
within the "useful arts" so defined.

"' Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone Cases), 126 U.S. 1, 533 (1888).
.. Plant patents and patents for business methods are but two examples inthe modern era.
"6 447 U.S. at 309.
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